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SCIENCE OR STATUS QUO? DISREGARD FOR A
DEFENDANT’S MENTAL ILLNESS IN TORT SUITS
Gabrielle Lindquist*
Abstract: Mental illness is almost never considered when courts determine whether a
defendant is liable for a tort. Nearly every United States jurisdiction—Washington state
included—declines to offer a modified “reasonable person” standard for negligent tort
defendants with mental illnesses or any form of mental illness-based affirmative defense for
intentional tort defendants. There is much debate about whether tort law should evolve to
accommodate defendants with mental illnesses. This Comment seeks to dive deeper into why
that debate persists.
Although there are numerous justifications for this current state of tort law, the most
common rationalizations given are twofold. First, that the primary principle of tort law is to
compensate the injured person. Second, that a mental illness-based affirmative defense or
modified negligence standard would be problematic to administer in that the factfinder would
not know where to “draw the line.” That is, the judge or juror may have difficulty determining
whether a defendant’s mental illness truly contributed to their tortious conduct. Many legal
scholars rebut this justification by referencing the existence of a modified negligence standard
for children and people with physical disabilities, and the availability of the insanity and/or
diminished capacity affirmative defenses in criminal courts.
This Comment seeks to provide more insight into the debate by answering the following
three questions: (1) Do mental health professionals think it would be possible to “draw the
line” and decide whether a defendant qualifies for an affirmative defense or modified
negligence standard due to their mental illness? (2) From the perspective of both civil attorneys
and mental health professionals, should such a defense and/or negligence standard be available
to tort defendants? (3) And would such a defense and/or negligence standard be “workable” in a
court of law? These questions are answered in the form of a survey-based research study, and the
results indicate a great divide between the opinions of mental health professionals and civil attorneys.
Mental health professionals endorse an affirmative defense of mental illness to intentional
torts, while civil attorneys oppose both the availability and workability of intentional tort
affirmative defenses and oppose a modified negligence standard. These results do not solidify
a definitive answer as to whether courts should consider the mental health of tort defendants.
Rather, they highlight a significant discrepancy between tort law and psychology. Even though
modern psychological and psychiatric knowledge about mental health tells us that mental
illness can mitigate tort culpability, courts and state legislators are unwilling to change the
status quo. This reticence to change is likely in the interest of upholding traditional principles
of tort law, conserving judicial resources and party expenses, and heeding legal workability
concerns.

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I would like to thank my
advisor, Christopher Carney, for his advice and guidance. Additionally, the research in this Comment
would not have been possible without all the participants who took time to fill out my survey. And,
last but not least, I very much appreciate the wonderful editorial staff of Washington Law Review and
would like to thank them their invaluable input and hard work.
*
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INTRODUCTION
In Washington State, and all other jurisdictions that offer the “insanity
defense” to criminal charges, a person with a mental illness could be
exculpated of a criminal assault charge, but found guilty for the exact
same offense in civil court.1 This is because mental illness is not a
permitted basis for an affirmative defense to an intentional tort suit.2
Similarly, while Washington state applies a modified “reasonable person”
standard to evaluate negligent tort defendants with physical disabilities,3
and child defendants,4 a modified standard is not utilized for defendants
with mental illnesses.5 Courts consider a defendant’s physical disability,
and a child defendant’s age, when determining how negligently—if at
all—a defendant acted under the circumstances.6 Physical disability and
minor age are mitigating factors that can either decrease the culpability
of, or entirely exculpate, some tort defendants.7 However, defendants with
mental illnesses are not evaluated under a modified standard, but rather
held to the standard of a reasonable person without the defendant’s mental
illness. This is true even if their mental illness may have been what caused
them to act negligently in the first place.8

1. Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 469, 474 (Conn. 1988); Teopffer v. Teopffer, 101 P.2d 904,
907 (Kan. 1940); Hackenberger v. Travelers Mut. Cas. Co., 62 P.2d 545, 547 (Kan. 1936); Phillips’
Comm. v. Wards Adm’r, 43 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1931); McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass.
1937); Bryant v. Carrier, 198 S.E. 619 (N.C. 1938); Sweeney v. Carter, 137 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. App.
1939); Shedrick v. Lathrop, 172 A. 630 (Vt. 1934); Garratt v. Dailey, 26 Wash. 2d 197, 205, 279 P.2d
1091, 1095 (1955); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Doty, 58 Wash. App. 546, 551, 794 P.2d 521,
525 (1990); Pub. Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rash, 48 Wash. App. 701, 705, 740 P.2d 370, 373 (1987)
(finding the defendant’s mental illness was irrelevant in a child sexual assault case; that is, once the
intent to commit the abuse was proved the intent to harm is inferable).
2. Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 417 P.2d 816 (Haw. 1966); Young v. Young, 132 S.W. 155 (Ky.
1910); McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937); Filip v. Gagne, 177 A.2d 509 (N.H. 1962);
Bryant v. Carrier, 198 S.E. 619 (N.C. 1938); Sweeney v. Carter, 137 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. App.
1939); Leary v. Oates, 84 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Shedrick v. Lathrop, 172 A. 630 (Vt.
1934); In re Meyer’s Guardianship, 261 N.W. 211 (Wis. 1935); Delahanty v. Hinkley, 799 F. Supp.
184 (D.D.C. 1992) (rejecting consideration of a tort defendant’s mental illness in federal court); see
also Jean M. Eggen, Mental Disabilities and Duty in Negligence Law: Will Neuroscience Reform Tort
Doctrine?, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 591, 600–02 (2015). cf. Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co.,
173 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970) (finding an exception for people operating motor vehicles who
become “sudden[ly] mentally incapacitated”).
3. Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 54 Wash. 2d 174, 338 P.2d 743 (1959).
4. Bauman by Chapman v. Crawford, 104 Wash. 2d 241, 704 P.2d 1181 (1985).
5. Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wash. App. 672, 124 P.3d 314 (2005).
6. Brunner v. John, 45 Wash. 2d 341, 343, 274 P.2d 581, 582 (1954).
7. Bauman, at 241, 704 P.2d at 1181; Fletcher, at 174, 338 P.2d at 743.
8. Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 319–20, 170 P. 1023, 1025 (1918).
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Currently, there are two opposing viewpoints regarding the culpability
of tort defendants with mental illnesses.9 On one side, countless judicial
opinions,10 as well as the Second11 and Third Restatements of Torts12—
albeit minimal scholarship13—cite various justifications for applying the
objective standard to negligence defendants with mental illnesses. These
opinions also advocate for maintaining the status quo with regard to
intentional tort affirmative defenses—disallowing any sort of mental
illness-based defense. On the other side, substantial legal scholarship calls
for change and rebuts the justifications for continuing to disallow
consideration of a tort defendant’s mental illness.14 While there are many
justifications for maintaining the status quo, two particular types of
justifications seem to be the most prevalent. The first is that adding mental
illness to the liability equation will bring about “administrability” and
9. A myriad of scholars advocate for consideration of the mental illnesses of tort defendants. Paul
S. Appelbaum, Responsibility for Torts: Should the Courts Continue to Ignore Mental Illness? 63 L.
& PSYCHIATRY 308 (2012); Johnny C. Chriscoe, A Plea to North Carolina: Bring Fairness to the
Assessment of Civil Battery Liability for Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities, 39 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 241 (2017); Johnny Criscoe & Lisa Lukasik, Re-examining Reasonableness: Negligence
Liability in Adult Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. (2015); Okianer
C. Dark, Tort Liability and the “Unquiet Mind”: A Proposal to Incorporate Mental Disabilities into
the Standard of Care, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 169 (2004); Eggen, supra note 2; James W. Ellis,
Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1079 (1981); Elizabeth
J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the Mentally Ill, 12 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 67 (1995); Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to
Psychosis: How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733 (2007);
Vaughn E. James, No Help for the Helpless: How the Law has Failed to Serve and Protect Persons
Suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 407 (2012); Patrick Kelley,
Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 179 (2003); Harry J.F. Korrell,
The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1995); Jacob E.
McKnite, When Reasonable Care is Unreasonable: Rethinking the Negligence Liability of Adults with
Mental Retardation, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1375 (2012); Grant H. Morris, Requiring Sound
Judgment of Unsound Minds: Tort Liability and the Limits of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 47 SMU L.
REV. 1837 (1994); David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Modified Standards in
Negligence Law: The Minor, The Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 17 (1981).
Contrarily, other scholars, and judges through their opinions, also advocate for maintaining the
current status quo of not allowing an affirmative defense of mental illness and continuing to hold
people with mental illnesses to the objective reasonable person standard. Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wash.
App. 672, 674–75, 124 P.3d 314, 316–17 (2005); George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, Mental
Illness As an Excuse for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 24 (1968); William J. Curran, Tort
Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52 (1960); Stephanie I. Splane,
Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983); Wm. Justis
Wilkinson, Mental Incompetency as a Defense to Tort Liability, 17 ROCKY MNTN. L. REV. 38 (1944).
10. Ramey, at 674–75, 124 P.3d at 316–17.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 2005).
13. Curran, supra note 9; Splane, supra note 9; Wilkinson, supra note 9.
14. Harlow, supra note 9; Goldstein, supra note 9; Kelley, supra note 9; Korrell, supra note 9.
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“line-drawing” problems.15 In other words, some legal professionals fear
that judges and juries may not be able to decide whether a person’s mental
illness qualifies them for an affirmative defense or modified negligence
standard.16 In the same vein, there are a multitude of mental illnesses, and
many do not manifest clear, tangible symptoms. So how would the courts
“draw the line?”17 Would severe Depressive Disorder suffice as an
affirmative defense to battery in a particular circumstance? What about
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder? Or Generalized Anxiety Disorder?
Another component of this justification is that consideration of a
defendant’s mental illness requires additional judicial resources, can
prolong litigation, and would be costly to the parties.18 Overall, however,
critics of the administrability and “line-drawing” justification respond that
criminal courts do this very “line-drawing” all the time, so civil courts
should be able to do so as well.19
The second, commonly cited justification is that the primary purpose
of tort law is to compensate the injured person.20 Courts frequently state
that between two innocent parties, the person who caused the injury is
liable to the person who incurred the injury.21 Many judicial opinions cite
this as a foundation of tort law, noting that the person who caused the
harm is the person who should have to pay for damage resulting from the
harm.22
15. Ramey, at 674–75, 124 P.3d at 316–17; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (AM. LAW
INST. 1965); Splane, supra note 9, at 156; Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751 (“Courts have argued that it
is impossible to determine whether a defendant is actually mentally ill or merely using bad
judgment.”); see Delahanty v. Hinkley, 799 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D.D.C. 1992); Jolley v. Powell, 299
So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. App. 1974); Williams v. Kearby, 775 P.2d 670 (Kan. App. 1989); Goff v. Taylor,
708 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1986); Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 450–51 (N.Y. 1894); Sforza v. Green
Bus Lines, Inc., 268 N.Y.S. 446, 448 (1934); Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300–01 (Or. Ct.
App. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt.s b(2) & b(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1965);
Korrell, supra note 9, at 27; McKnite, supra note 9, at 1389.
16. Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751; Korrell, supra note 9, at 34–40 (labeling this as the “Burden on
the Courts” justification).
17. Kuhn v. Zabotsky, 224 N.E.2d 137, 140 (Ohio 1967).
18. Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751
19. Appelbaum, supra note 9, at 309 (“[D]eterminations about the connection between mental
impairment and behavior are made routinely by the criminal courts.”); Goldstein, supra note 9, at 76–
78; Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751; RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. ARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST HINCKLEY ERA 134–35 (1988); RITA J.
SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 176–77 (1967); see also AAPL Practice Guideline
for Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 THE J. OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & THE L. supp. 3 (2014).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST 1965).
21. Id.; see also Appelbaum, supra note 9, at 309; Criscoe & Lukasik, supra note 9, at 25; Harlow,
supra note 9, at 1747-48; Korrell, supra note 9, at 27; Splane, supra note 9, at 156, 167.
22. Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Wis. 1996); Jankee v. Clark Cty.,
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This Comment seeks to provide more insight into the debate by
answering three questions. First, do mental health professionals think it
would be possible to “draw the line” and decide whether a defendant
qualifies for a specific affirmative defense or modified negligence
standard due to their mental illness? Second, do civil attorneys think a
mental illness-based defense and/or modified negligence standard be
available to a tort defendant? Why or why not? And third, would such a
defense and/or negligence standard be “workable” in a court of law? For
the purposes of this Comment, “workable” means that a factfinder (judge
or jury) could use the expert testimony of a mental health professional, in
addition to the facts of a case, to decide whether a defendant qualifies for
a mental illness defense or modified negligence standard.
Part I of this Comment discusses the current state of negligence tort law
and the “reasonable person” standard, as well as exceptions to this
standard. It also discusses intentional tort law and the use of the insanity
defense and diminished capacity defense in Washington state criminal
courts. Part I also explains that Washington courts consider the mental
health of plaintiffs in tort suits, but not defendants. Part II then details two
of the primary “justifications” proffered in court opinions and secondary
sources that seek to explain why defendants’ mental illnesses are not, and
should not be, factored into tort law determinations of fault. Part III details
the Author’s empirical research on the “administrability” and “drawing
the line” justification, and the “faultless-but-guilty” justification. In
conducting the research, the Author surveyed mental health professionals
and civil attorneys, asking their professional opinions on whether a
modified negligence standard and mental illness-based affirmative
defenses should be available to Washington state tort defendants.
Finally, Part IV discusses the results and implications of the data
obtained from the surveys, in conjunction with the court opinions and
legal scholarship from Parts I and II—concluding that there exists a great
divide between psychology and the law in this particular area. Mental
health professionals reported that “line drawing” is indeed possible, and
that a mental illness-based affirmative defense is necessary from a
psychological or medical perspective. Civil attorneys, however, reported
that a mental illness-based defense and modified negligence standard
should not be made available to tort defendants, and that neither would be
workable in civil suits. The attorney participants largely explained their
opinions by citing administrability and “faultless-but-guilty”
justifications.

612 N.W.2d 297, 312 (Wis. 2000); Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 470 (Conn. 1988); Dark, supra
note 9, at 176 (discussing Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616), the bedrock English case
establishing that mental illness is no defense).
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Although the data cannot answer whether courts should consider
mental illness in tort liability, this research evidences an important reason
for why the “mental-illness-in-tort-suits” debate persists: The legal
community is ignoring psychological and medical expertise on the role
that mental illness can play in tortious culpability. When one side of a
debate ceases to consider the knowledge of the other side, a standstill
ensues—as has happened here. Therefore, mental illness will remain
unconsidered in tort suits unless judges and legislators decide to weigh
the expertise of mental health professionals more heavily than attorneys’
concerns about workability.
I.

NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS AND INTENTIONAL
TORT DEFENSES

Despite significant advancements in society’s understanding of mental
health, modern tort law provides no accommodations for defendants with
mental illnesses.23 Like tort law in all U.S. jurisdictions, Washington state
tort law provides neither a modified “reasonable person with the
defendant’s mental illness” standard for negligence tort defendants nor an
affirmative defense for intentional tort defendants with mental illnesses.24
A.

Negligence: The Reasonable Person Standard and Exceptions

To prevail in a negligence suit, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
breached their duty to use reasonable care.25 This reasonable care standard
is assessed in light of what an objectively reasonable person under similar
circumstances would have done.26 Courts have essentially created a
23. Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wash. App. 672, 675, 124 P.3d 314, 317 (2005); Splane, supra note 9, at
154; Korrell, supra note 9, at 1; Kelley, supra note 9, at 180; Goldstein, supra note 9, at 67;
Appelbaum, supra note 9, at 308.
24. Ramey, at 675–77, 124 P.3d at 317 (“Washington, along with the majority of states, holds the
mentally ill to the standard of a reasonable person under like circumstances.”); Criez v. Sunset Motor
Co., 123 Wash. 604, 608, 213 P. 7 (1923); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (AM. LAW
INST 1965).
25. Hvolboll v. Wolff Co., 187 Wash. App. 37, 347 P.3d 476 (2015); 6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern
Jury Instructions Civ. WPI 10.01 (7th ed.) (“Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is
the doing of some act that a reasonably careful person would not do under the same or similar
circumstances or the failure to do some act that a reasonably careful person would have done under
the same or similar circumstances.”).
26. See Swank v. Valley Christian School, 188 Wash.2d 663, 398 P.3d 1108 (2017); Ranger Ins.
Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wash. 2d 545, 192 P.3d 886 (2008); Estate of Bruce Templeton ex rel.
Templeton v. Daffern, 98 Wash.App. 677, 682, 990 P.2d 968, 971 (2007) (“At the root of any common
law negligence action is the common law duty to exercise reasonable care (or, in alternative terms,
the common law duty to exercise at least as much care as a reasonable person would exercise under
the same or similar circumstances). This duty is breached when a defendant fails to exercise ordinary

Document1 (Do Not Delete)

2020]

Disregard for a Defendant’s Mental Illness

5/30/2020 10:23 PM

121

fictional “reasonable person” so allegedly negligent defendants can be
evaluated against an objective, yet hypothetical, standard. A “reasonable
person” is someone who exercises the average care, skill, and judgment
in their actions.27 And a defendant has failed to meet this standard if they
did not conform their actions to that of a reasonable person, thereby
breaching their duty to act with reasonable care.28 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts specifies that negligence is “a departure from a standard
of conduct demanded by the community for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk.”29
1.

Exception: Children

The objective, reasonable person standard does make exceptions for
people who cannot be expected behave like a “reasonable person” all the
time.30 This is because certain subsets of people, mainly children and
people with physical disabilities, are unable to conform their conduct to
the generally required norms of society.31 “[W]hen application of the
reasonable person standard would impose liability on one who . . . is
unable to conform [their] conduct to the generally required norm, courts
must reject the objective reasonable person standard and take into account
the actor’s inability to comply.”32 Washington state tort law employs a
modified standard for children because children are not expected to
conform their actions to those of a reasonable adult person.33 In fact,
care (or, in alternative terms, when a defendant fails to exercise as much care as a reasonable person
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances). Any such failure is ‘negligence.’”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 283, 292, 298–99 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
27. Gall v. McDonald Indus., 84 Wash. App. 194, 204, 926 P.2d 934, 939 (1996); Baughn v.
Malone, 33 Wash. App. 592, 597, 656 P.2d 1118, 1123 (1983); Mathis v. Ammons, 84 Wash. App.
411, 416, 928 P.2d 431, 434 (1996).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 283, 292, 298–99 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965). “The standard which the
community demands must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the individual
judgment, good or bad, of the particular individual. It must be the same for all persons, since the law
can have no favorites; and yet allowance must be made for some of the differences between
individuals, the risk apparent to the actor, his capacity to meet it, and the circumstances under which
he must act.” Id.
30. Korrell, supra note 9, at 23.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 22–23.
33. See Robinson v. Lindsay, 92 Wash. 2d 410, 598 P.2d 392 (1979) (where the finding that the
trial judge erred in holding 13-year-old snowmobile operator to child’s standard; by operating
dangerous instrumentality child assumed duty of reasonable person without regard to age); see also
Bauman by Chapman v. Crawford, 104 Wash. 2d 241, 704 P.2d 1181 (1985) (finding that a child
bicyclist is negligent in failing to obey the standard if a child of similar age, intelligence, maturity,
and experience would have behaved differently); WASH. PATTERN Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC § 10.04
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jurisdictions throughout the United States apply a modified standard of
care for determining the negligence of a child by considering how a
hypothetical “child of like age, intelligence[, capacity] and experience”
would have acted in similar circumstances.34
The rationale for this modified standard for children is that a child does
not possess “the judgment, discretion, and experience of an adult.”35 It
would be unfair to base the legal fault of a child on the behavior of an
objectively reasonable adult, which most children are mentally and/or
physically incapable of meeting.36 The child’s “immaturity of judgment
and lack of capacity to appreciate dangers” is the crux of what “justifies
[the] special . . . standard.”37 Furthermore, the modified reasonable child
standard is realistic as it allows for the “normal incapacities and
indiscretions of youth.”38 The Restatement (Second) of Torts also notes
that this modified standard is justified by public interest in, and sympathy
towards, the welfare of children, as well as the great extent of societal
knowledge about what we can reasonably expect from children.39

2.

Exception: People with Physical Disabilities

Another exception to the objective reasonable person standard is the
modified standard for people with physical disabilities.40 Washington
state civil courts have noted that a defendant’s physical disability at the
(2016); David K. DeWolf & Keller W. Allen, Reasonable Care Defined—Children, 16 Wash. Prac.,
Tort Law & Prac. § 2:31 (4th ed. 2018); (“A child’s conduct is measured by the conduct of a
reasonably careful child of the same age, intelligence, maturity, training, and experience.”).
34. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) TORTS § 283 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1934). This standard is applicable
to both negligence and contributory negligence. Id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283A
(AM. LAW INST.1965) (“If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to
avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under
like circumstances.”).
35. Bauman, 104 Wash. 2d at 244, 704 P.2d at 1187.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Kelley, supra note 9, at 190; Korrell, supra note 9, at 23.
38. Bauman, 104 Wash. 2d at 244, 704 P.2d at 1184 (“Washington has long recognized the
special standard of care applicable to children: a child’s conduct is measured by the conduct of a
reasonably careful child of the same age, intelligence, maturity, training and experience.”); see also
Kelley, supra note 9, at 190; Robinson v. Lindsay, 92 Wash. 2d 410, 412, 598 P.2d 392, 393
(1979); Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525, 544–45, 43 P. 641, 647 (1896).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
40. Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 54 Wash. 2d 174, 179, 338 P.2d 743, 746 (1959) (finding that a
blind pedestrian is only held to the standard of care that a reasonable person with the same or similar
disability would use); Brunner v. John, 45 Wash. 2d 341, 343, 274 P.2d 581, 582 (1954) (discussing
that the trial judge should have taken into account 87-year-old plaintiff’s physical infirmity).
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time of the alleged negligence is highly relevant to the determination of
whether the defendant can be held liable for their actions.41 This is because
people with physical disabilities may be unable to conform their conduct
to that of an objectively reasonable person without their disability. 42 For
instance, people who are blind or hard-of-hearing are “only required to
take the contributory precautions reasonable in light of [their]
limitation.” 43 That is, the reasonable person standard is often lowered to
accommodate a person’s physical disability.44 The standard of care for a
person with a physical disability is that of a reasonable person “under like
disability.”45 The main rationales for applying this modified standard are
the public’s familiarity with physical disabilities “and the ease and
certainty with which physical disabilities may be proven.”46 The
Restatement (Third) of Torts explains: “The conduct of an actor with a
physical disability is negligent only if the conduct does not conform to
that of a reasonably careful person with the same disability.”47
In Masterson v. Lennon,48 the Washington State Supreme Court found
that a blind person must be held to a modified standard of care.49 That is, a
blind person must “exercise th[e] degree of care that an ordinarily careful
and prudent person would have exercised under the circumstances and in a
similar [physical] condition.”50 The Washington State Supreme Court has
applied this same standard to other physical disabilities as well.51

41. Brunner, at 343, 274 P.2d at 582; Horney v. Giering, 132 Wash. 555, 560–62, 231 P. 958, 960
(1925).
42. Korrell, supra note 9, at 39–40; Criscoe & Lukasik, supra note 9, at 46, 77.
43. Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law (Univ. Chi., Inst. Law & Econ.
Working
Paper
No. 10,
=
2015), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2417&context=law_and_e
conomics [https://perma.cc/NKL9-HGEK].
44. Id. at 10–11 (“[F]or example, [for a blind or deaf person] such precautions cannot include
looking or listening for a train at a railroad crossing.”); id. at 11 n.28 (“These obligations to stop and
listen [before going over the tracks of a railroad] must receive a reasonable construction and
interpretation . . . [a party] cannot be required to listen if he is deaf . . . .” (quoting Railroad v. Dies,
98 Tenn. 655, 663 (1897))).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
46. Splane, supra note 9, at 160 n.39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C cmt.
b (1965)).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS § 11(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
48. See Masterson v. Lennon, 115 Wash. 305, 308–09, 197 P. 38, 39 (1921) (holding that the trial
court correctly permitted the jury consider the defendant’s blindness in assessing negligence).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Robinson v. Lindsay, 92 Wash. 2d 410, 412, 598 P.2d 392, 393–94 (1979) (explaining that
exceptions to the reasonable person standard developed when the individual whose conduct was alleged
to have been negligent suffered from some physical impairment such as blindness or deafness).

Document1 (Do Not Delete)

124
3.

5/30/2020 10:23 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 95:115

No “Reasonable Person” Standard Exception for Mental Illness

There is no modified negligence standard for defendants with mental
illnesses. Although Washington state has carved out a modified
negligence standard for children52 and defendants with physical
disabilities,53 no state (or federal jurisdiction for that matter) has done so
for tort defendants with mental illnesses.54 For example, in Colorado and
Connecticut, courts have found that defendants with severe mental
illnesses such as Schizophrenia are not evaluated against a modified,
reasonable-person-with-the-defendant’s-mental-illness standard.55
Rather, these people are held to the objectively reasonable person
standard, even if their mental illness may have caused or contributed to
their tortious actions.56 This is the case despite the fact that psychology
and medicine have demonstrated that physical and mental disabilities are
not necessarily distinct,57 and also despite the fact that some people with
mental illnesses can be rendered the cognitive age of a child.58
The practice of holding people with mental illnesses to the standard of
an objectively reasonable person has historic roots; specifically, the
52. Bauman by Chapman v. Crawford, 104 Wash. 2d 241, 244, 704 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1985)
(holding that a child bicyclist would be negligent only if a child of similar age, intelligence, maturity,
and experience would not have also behaved negligently); Robinson, at 412, 598 P.2d at 393 (ruling
that a thirteen-year-old child operating a snowmobile is held to the reasonable person, not reasonable
child, standard because operating a snowmobile is an adult activity and therefore the child assumed
the duty of with reasonable adult care); Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525, 544–45, 43 P. 641,
647 (1896) (reasoning that a child’s age and maturity level were necessary to consider when
determining contributory negligence); see also Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC § 10.05 (2016);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
53. Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 54 Wash. 2d 174, 179, 338 P.2d 743, 746 (1959) (holding that a
blind pedestrian was not liable for negligence because a blind person is only obliged to use care that
a reasonable person with the same or similar physical disability would use); Brunner v. John, 45
Wash. 2d 341, 343, 274 P.2d 581, 582 (1954) (holding that the jury should take into account an eightyseven-year-old plaintiff’s physical infirmity).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see Criez v. Sunset Motor
Co., 123 Wash. 604, 608, 213 P. 7, 10–11 (1923); J.A. BRYANT, JR., LIABILITY OF INSANE PERSON
FOR HIS OWN NEGLIGENCE, 49 A.L.R. 3D 189 (1973).
55. Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 473–74 (Conn. 1988); Johnson v. Lambote, 363 P.2d 165,
166–67 (Colo. 1961).
56. See Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wash. App. 672, 689, 124 P.3d 314, 323 (2005) (trial court properly
rejected insanity defense to negligence claim).
57. Korrell, supra note 9, at 14.
58. Some sources proffer that people with Intellectual Disability disorder often have lower than
average IQ score. Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, https://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition [https://perma.cc/J6TB-LWAP] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2019); see also Kelly Herzberg, M.D., Autism and IQ, THE AUTISM BLOG, SEATTLE
CHILDREN’S HOSP. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://theautismblog.seattlechildrens.org/autism-andiq/ [https://perma.cc/V6GT-V8RT] (discussing autism); NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G, & MED., Clinical
Characteristics of Intellectual Disabilities, in MENTAL DISORDERS AND DISABILITIES AMONG LOWINCOME CHILDREN, ch. 9 (Thomas F. Boat & Joel T. Wu eds., 2015).
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English case from 1616, Weaver v. Ward.59 In Weaver, court stated that
“‘if a lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass.’”60 The court
seemed to allude to mental incapacitation as being an insufficient defense
to the tort of trespass.61 However, many scholars consider this dicta
because the defendant in Weaver did not have a mental illness, nor was he
asserting such a defense.62 Nonetheless, the Weaver case set the precedent
the court’s holding in an American case, Williams v. Hays,63 where the
court determined that insanity was no defense to negligence.64
The Restatement (Third) of Torts also disclaims any exception to the
objective reasonable person standard for adult defendants with mental
disabilities, but does so for children.65 This is the case even though some
mental illnesses can reduce a person’s mental age and/or intellectual
functioning.66 Furthermore, the line between physical disability and
mental illness is by no means a bright one.67 With modern advances in
science and medicine, we now know that most mental illnesses have
biological and physical underpinnings.68
The Restatement (Second) of Torts also distinguishes between physical
and mental illnesses, noting that a “heart attack, or a temporary dizziness
due to fever or nausea” are both “circumstances to be taken into account,”
but mental illness is no such “circumstance.”69 The authors of the
Restatement proffer that this distinction exists because the public is more
familiar with physical illnesses and because physical illnesses can be
proved with greater certainty than mental illnesses.70 However, the
59. Eli K. Best, Atypical Actors and Tort Law’s Expressive Function, 96 MARQUETTE L. REV. 461,
465 (2012) (citing Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616)).
60. Id. (citing Weaver, 80 Eng. Rep. 284).
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 135,
1072 (5th ed. 1984).
63. 38 N.E. 449, 450 (N.Y. 1894) (finding that an “insane” ship captain was liable for negligently
refusing help from ships passing by his broken boat).
64. Best, supra note 59, at 465 (citing Williams 38 N.E. 449).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS §11(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2005) (“An actor’s mental or emotional
disability is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”);
see also id. cmt. e.
66. See supra n.52 and accompanying text.
67. “The courts’ continued distinction between mental and physical disabilities ignores decades of
research and discovery in the fields of neurology and psychiatry . . . . [T]he medical community
commonly accepts that nearly all psychiatric and developmental problems which might prevent one
from conforming his conduct to the standard required of ‘healthy’ people are manifestations of
physiological abnormalities.” Korrell, supra note 9, at 1–3, 14.
68. Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283C (AM. LAW. INST. 1965); see Splane, supra note 9, at
159–60.
70. Splane, supra note 9, at 159–60.
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rationale is somewhat inconsistent with science in that mental and
physical illnesses are not necessarily distinct.71 “The courts’ continued
distinction between mental and physical disabilities ignores decades of
research and discovery in the fields of neurology and psychiatry.”72
Importantly, medical doctors generally accept that physiological
underpinnings explain, or at least contribute to, most psychological
disorders.73 For example, a brain lesion can cause physical damage such
as loss of muscle control, blindness, and neurological damage generally.74
These physical injuries manifest in ways that can affect emotion, memory,
inhibitions, etc.75 Despite the fact that the source of the physical damage
and the resulting mental damage is the same—the brain lesion—the
current state of tort law permits legal consideration of the physiological
but not psychological effects of the same injury.76 Additional examples
include: Schizophrenia, which is actually “a behavioral manifestation of
an excess of dopaminergic transmission within the brain;” 77 and
depression, which is caused by neural abnormalities.78
One mental illness-related exception—one which Washington state has
not yet recognized—is a “sudden mental incapacity” defense to
negligence.79 However, this defense has only been applied in very limited
contexts.80 This defense requires a defendant to establish that: (1) they had
71. Korrell, supra note 9, at 14.
72. Id.
73. Id. (“[T]he medical community commonly accepts that nearly all psychiatric and
developmental problems . . . are manifestations of physiological abnormalities.”).
74. Korrell, supra note 9, at 16–17 (citing RICHARD M. RESTAK, M.D., THE BRAIN 147–49 (1984)).
75. Id. at 15–16.
76. Id. at 19 (“Under the current classification scheme, the manifestations of these physiological
traumas that impair thought processes, emotion, volition, inhibitions or memory are ‘mental’
disabilities. The manifestations that impair the victim’s eyesight, hearing, sense of smell, or control
of his limbs are ‘physical’ disabilities.”).
Many mental illnesses have physiological causes, for instance: “Lesions on the temporal lobes can
produce dramatic personality changes and violent behavior. Damage to the basal ganglia, the part of
the brain that regulates motor functions, also manifests psychiatric symptoms,
including . . . Parkinson’s disease . . . . Damage to other brain systems can cause memory loss,
hallucinations, paranoia, speech problems, schizophrenia, affective disorders, and myriad other
symptoms.” Id. at 15–16 (citing NANCY C. ANDREASEN, M.D., PH.D. & DONALD W. BLACK, M.D.,
INTRODUCTORY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 103, 101–138 (1991)).
77. RICHARD M. RESTAK, M.D., THE BRAIN 291 (1984).
78. Larry Westreich, M.D., Philip A. Bialer, M.D., Delirium and Acute Psychosis, 92
POSTGRADUATE MED. 319, 320 tbl.1 (2016) (discussing the fact that neurotransmitter abnormalities
contribute to depression).
79. Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wash. App. 672, 674–75, 124 P.3d 314, 316–17 (2005) (rejecting
application of the sudden mental incapacitation defense in this particular case); see also Michael F.
Dubis, Insanity as a Tort Defense, 54 MARQUETTE L. REV. 245, 246–47 (1971).
80. See e.g., Word v. Jones ex el. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 145–47 (N.C. 1999) (allowing the defense
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no prior notice or forewarning of their potential for becoming mentally
disabled, and (2) the disability rendered them incapable of conforming to
the standards of ordinary care.81 For instance, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recognized this defense for a driver who “suddenly and without
warning was seized with a mental aberration or delusion which rendered
her unable to operate the automobile with her conscious mind.”82
Again, this is a highly limited defense that has not yet been applied in
Washington State.
In sum, defendants in negligence tort actions are generally held to the
objectively “reasonable person” standard. There are exceptions for
children and people with physical disabilities, in which age and physical
impairment, respectively, are factored into whether a defendant acted with
reasonable care. However, there is no such exception for people with
mental illnesses. A defendant with a mental illness in a negligence suit is
held to the standard of an objectively “reasonable person” without that
defendant’s mental illness.
B.

Intentional Torts and Affirmative Defenses

The lack of an exception for tort defendants with mental illnesses is
paralleled in the world of intentional torts as well. While negligence
involves a defendant who has failed to exercise due care and accidentally
harms another person, an intentional tort involves a defendant who acts
intentionally and purposefully causes harm to another individual.83 All
intentional torts require that the defendant “commit a voluntary act and
that the harm suffered by the plaintiff be the result of the defendant’s
intentional conduct.”84 Importantly, the “act” component must be
volitional,85 meaning voluntary.86 The “intent” element requires that the
defendant “acted with a purpose to achieve the result of [their] act, or that
of sudden mental incapacitation where the defendant had Alzheimer’s and was sued for negligent
driving); Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 283, 287 (Wis. 1996) (holding that a
defendant’s mental disability must be considered in a negligence suit where the defendant has been
institutionalized for a mental disability and where the plaintiff is the defendant’s caretaker); Breunig
v American Family Insurance Co. 173 N.W.2d 619, 621–22 (Wis. 1970) (finding that the jury must
be allowed to consider the defendant’s mental illness where the defendant “suddenly and without
warning was seized with a mental aberration or delusion which rendered her unable to operate the
automobile with her conscious mind”).
81. Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970).
82. Id. at 622.
83. See DeWolf & Allen, supra note 33, § 14:2.
84. Id.; see also Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 145 Wash. 2d 137, 146–47, 34 P.3d
809, 813–14 (2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW. INST 1965) (defining “act”);
id. § 7 (defining “injury and harm”).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
86. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 8, 31.
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[they] believed that the consequences were substantially certain to result
from it.”87 This “intent” requirement applies to all intentional torts, such
as assault,88 battery,89 false imprisonment,90 and trespass.91
There are some affirmative defenses available for intentional torts,
which do not negate an element of the tort, but instead provide an
explanation for the defendant’s tortious act(s).92 Examples of these
include self-defense,93 consent,94 defense of others,95 and prevention of
trespass.96 However, courts do not recognize an affirmative defense of
mental illness—even in cases where a defendant was deemed Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) for the same conduct in a criminal court.97
1.

Insanity as an Affirmative Defense in Criminal Court

Although mental illness is not recognized as an affirmative defense to
intentional torts, Washington state recognizes the affirmative defense of
insanity in criminal cases.98 Criminal courts allow this affirmative defense
because legal “insanity” interferes with the defendant’s mental state and
ability to form the requisite, criminal, intent.99 The exact verbiage of the
Washington State insanity defense is as follows:
To establish the defense of insanity, it must be shown that: (1) At
the time of the commission of the offense, as a result of mental
87. DeWolf & Allen, supra note 33, § 14:2; see also Sutton v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 180 Wash. App.
859, 867–68, 324 P.3d 763, 767 (2014).
88. Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wash. App. 87, 92–93, 943 P.2d 1141, 1144–45 (1997)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)).
89. Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 202–05, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094–95 (1955); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
90. Kellogg v. State, 94 Wash. 2d 851, 856, 621 P.2d 133, 137 (1980) (false imprisonment).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
92. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.020(3) (1986); Hellriegel v. Tholl, 69 Wash. 2d 97, 106, 417
P.2d 362, 367–68 (1966).
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.020(3) (1986); Parrott-Horjes v. Rice, 168 Wash. App. 438, 276
P.3d 376 (2012), as amended (May 23, 2012) (admitting evidence of self-defense).
94. Hart v. Geysel, 159 Wash. 632, 636, 294 P. 570, 572 (1930); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 49–51, 53, 56 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.020(3) (1986). People with mental illnesses have been held liable
for “assault and battery, false imprisonment, trespass on land, destruction of property, conversion,
wrongfully suing out an injunction, alienation of affections, infringement of a patent,” etc. KEETON
ET AL., supra note 62, § 135, 1072–73 (internal citations omitted).
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.020(3) (1986); see also Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co.,
13 Wash. 2d 485, 506, 125 P.2d 681, 691 (1942).
97. Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 472–74 (Conn. 1988).
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (2011).
99. Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC § 20.01; see also State v. Thomas, 8 Wash. App. 495,
499–502, 507 P.2d 153, 156–57 (1973); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Actus Reus, Mens
Rea, and Brain Science: What Do Volition and Intent Really Mean?, 106 KY. L.J. 265, 298–99 (2018).
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disease or defect, the mind of the actor was affected to such an
extent that: (a) He or she was unable to perceive the nature and
quality of the act with which he or she is charged; or (b) He or she
was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the
particular act charged. (2) The defense of insanity must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence.100
The result of acquittal due to a verdict of insanity is usually involuntary
commitment to a mental health treatment facility.101
Washington state also offers a diminished capacity defense for criminal
defendants.102 This defense may be raised when three requirements are
met: “(1) the crime charged must include a particular mental state as an
element; (2) the defendant must present evidence of a mental disorder;
and (3) expert testimony must logically and reasonably connect the
defendant’s alleged mental condition with the asserted inability to form
the mental state required for the crime charged.”103 Specifically, the
diminished capacity defense is used to negate the “intent” element of most
crimes:104 “If specific intent or knowledge is an element [of the crime
charged], evidence of diminished capacity can then be considered in
determining whether the defendant had the capacity to form the requisite
mental state.”105
Factfinders in criminal cases use the information provided by expert
testimonies to inform their decision-making process about whether a
criminal defendant meets all the elements of an NGRI or diminished
capacity defense.106 Past and recent history demonstrates that juries in
criminal cases do indeed understand how to apply the NGRI jury
instructions to the facts of a case.107 Even so, the prevalence of defendants

100. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (2011).
101. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 99, at 298–99.
102. See State v. Thomas, 123 Wn. App. 771, 779, 98 P.3d 1258 (2004); Wash. Pattern Jury Instr.
Crim. WPIC § 18.20.
103. Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC § 18.20; see also State v. Eakins, 127 Wn.2d 490, 502,
902 P.2d 1236 (1995).
104. Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and
Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 47–49 (2007).
105. Thomas, 123 Wn. App. at 779, 98 P.3d at 1262; see also Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC
§ 18.20.
106. Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751 (“[N]ot only is legal insanity effectively determined in the
criminal context, but it is currently being used in the context of contract law, probate, health care, and
family law.”).
107. RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 176–77 (1967); see also Goldstein,
supra note 9, at 78 (“Indeed, it is not evident that jurors will understand less about mental illness than
other substantive areas of knowledge needed to resolve a case (i.e., the correct way to build a bridge
or deliver a baby).”).
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asserting the insanity defense is actually minimal. 108 For instance, the
insanity defense is asserted in approximately just one percent of felony
cases, and only one-quarter of defendants who raised the insanity defense
in a 1991 study (which included Washington state) were successful.109
Many scholars argue that the availability of the insanity defense to
criminal offenses inherently means that it should also be available for
intentional tort suits.110
C.

Tort Law Considers the Mental Health of Plaintiffs

Although Washington courts do not permit an affirmative defense or a
modified standard for tort defendants with mental illnesses, they do
consider the mental state of the tort plaintiffs.111 This is exhibited by
Washington courts’ adoption of the eggshell plaintiff principle—
sometimes referred to as “particular susceptibility”112—and recognition of
the tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED).113
The idea behind the particular susceptibility rule is that “a tortfeasor
takes his victim as he finds him, and must bear liability for the manner
and degree in which his fault manifests itself on the individual physiology
of the victim.”114 The purpose of this rule is to protect a plaintiff’s ability
to recover damages, even when the plaintiff’s losses are much greater than

108. Criscoe & Lukasik, supra note 9, at 31 (“According to the Virginia Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services, only one percent of felony defendants
nationwide raise the insanity defense[;] [t]he rate of these defendants successfully pleading the
insanity defense is even lower—less than 0.002%”).
109. Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An EightState Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 331, 337 (1991).
110. See, e.g., Harlow, supra note note 9, at 1758 (explaining that the Model Penal Code “standard
for determining mental disease or defect for purposes of criminal defense . . . may be easily adjusted
to fit a negligence action”); Kelley, supra note 9, at 188 (“A number of other authors in the late
nineteenth century urged that the criminal and tort law rules regarding the liability of children and the
insane should be the same, without invoking Holmes’s overriding deterrence theory. These authors
argued, simply, that it was unfair to hold someone civilly liable for conduct he could not have avoided
because of his age or mental condition, just as it is unfair to hold someone criminally liable for that
conduct.”); Korrell, supra note 9, at 52 (“Like the criminal jury that acquitted him, a civil jury should
have no trouble concluding that [the defendant] could not reasonably have been expected to act any
other way.”).
111. Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 180 Wash. 2d 481, 506, 325 P.3d 193, 205 (2014) (Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress); Vickers v. Olaes, No. 53579-0-I, 2005 WL 352094, at *3 (Wash.
Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2005) (discussing Washington State’s “particular susceptibility” principle—also
known as the eggshell plaintiff principle).
112. Lawrence v. TruGreen Landcare, LLC, No. 67245-2-I, 2013 WL 68579, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 7, 2013).
113. Kumar, 180 Wash. 2d at 506, 325 P.3d at 205.
114. Buchalski v. Universal Marine Corp., 393 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
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they would have been if the plaintiff did not have a pre-existing physical
or mental condition.115
NIED, albeit available in Washington state, is quite limited in its
applicability.116 It is a cause of action specifically for family members to
recover “‘foreseeable’, intangible injuries caused by viewing a physically
injured loved one shortly after a traumatic accident.”117 In Washington, a
cause of action for NIED is recognized only “where a plaintiff witnesses
the victim’s injuries at the scene of an accident shortly after it occurs and
before there is a material change in the attendant circumstances.”118 Thus,
Washington courts are willing to consider an person’s mental illness if they
are the plaintiff, but unwilling to do so when they are the defendant.119
II.

PRIMARY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE
STATUS QUO

Courts and legal scholars have proffered countless justifications for not
applying modified negligence standard to defendants with mental
illnesses and not offering an affirmative, insanity- or diminished capacityeqsue defense to intentional torts. Two justifications, however, stand out
above the others and seem to be the most commonly proffered by courts
and legal scholars.120 These justifications—and their respective
rebuttals—are outlined in the first section of this Part.121
A.

The Administrability and “Drawing-the-Line” Justification

Courts, legal scholars, and lawmakers are concerned with the
possibility that a factfinder would not be able to “draw the line” due to the
broad range in the severity of mental health issues and the fact that some
affect behavior and general functioning significantly more than others.122
That is, which mental illnesses under which particular circumstance could
exculpate a defendant sued for negligence? And which would qualify a
defendant for a mental illness-related affirmative defense in an intentional
tort suit? The court in a Washington Supreme Court case, Ramey v.
115. Harlow, supra note note 9, at 17.
116. Cortese v. Wells, No. 76748-8-I, 2017 WL 2539627, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
117. Colbert v. Moomba Sports, Inc., 163 Wash. 2d 43, 49, 176 P.3d 497, 500 (2008).
118. Hegel, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 132, 960 P.2d 424 429; see also Cortese, 2017 WL 2539627, at *2–
3.
119. Harlow, supra note 9, at 16–17.
120. This assertion is based on the author’s extensive research, finding that two justifications were
mentioned in most judicial opinions and journal articles.
121. The myriad other justifications are beyond the scope of this Comment.
122. Criscoe & Lukasik, supra note 9, at 29; Korrell, supra note 9, at 27; Splane, supra note 9, at
156.
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Knorr,123 stated that “the existence and degree of one’s mental illness can
be difficult to measure and is a major obstacle for applying a mental
deficiency defense.”124 In fact, “administrability arguments may be the
most commonly cited reason for maintaining an objective reasonable
person standard for those who are mentally ill.” 125 Administrability
arguments include the concern that it may be difficult to determine
whether a defendant’s mental illness truly affected their tort liability (the
“line-drawing” justification).126 Another concern that seems to fall within
the umbrella of an administrability argument is that an affirmative defense
or modified negligence standard would require additional expenditure of
judicial resources and increase the parties’ litigation costs due to, for
instance, prolonged litigation procedures and hiring expert witnesses.127
The administrability justification— which includes supposed difficulty
in “drawing the line “— persists despite the fact that modern psychology
and psychiatry can tell us a great deal about the effects and underpinnings
of various mental illnesses.128 In fact, modern psychological tests are
highly effective at identifying defendants whose mental illness
contributed to a particular behavior or action.129 Psychiatrists are
“[e]ffectively identifying defendants with a mental illness that impairs
their capacity for understanding negligent action is an existing and
effective part of the justice system.”130 And “states have created detailed
manuals providing processes for determining the mental status
of defendants.”131

123. Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wash. App. 672, 124 P.3d 314 (2005).
124. Id. at 676, 124 P.3d at 317; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (AM. LAW
INST. 1965).
125. Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751 (citing Korrell, supra note 9 at 34–40).
126. Korrell, supra note supra note 9, at 35.
127. See Korrell, supra note 9, at 30, 31 (discussing the cost and evidentiary problems that come
with a subjective standard for people with mental illnesses).
128. See Korrell, supra note 9, at 14–17.
129. Jill S. Hayes, David B. Hale, & William Drew Gouvier,, Malingering Detection in a Mentally
Retarded Forensic Population, 5 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOL. 33 (1998) (showing that four
psychological tests were able to accurately distinguish people with mental illnesses from people
pretending to have a mental illness in order to escape criminal liability); Richard Rogers, J. Roy Gillis,
& R. Michael Bagby, The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: A Validation Study with a Correctional
Sample, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85, 89 (1990) (demonstrating that 88% of the correctional population
who were evaluated on a new scale were successfully identified as either “malingering”—pretending
to have a mental illness—or clinical—actually having a mental illness)); see generally JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 343–352 (3rd ed. 2001) (outlining the myriad of tests
that can be used to determine “insanity”).
130. Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751–52 (citing H. Patrick Furman, The Definition and
Determination of Insanity in Colorado, 21 COLO. L. 693 (1992)).
131. Harlow, supra note 9, at 1751–52 (citing H. Patrick Furman, The Definition and
Determination of Insanity in Colorado, 21 COLO. L. 693 (1992)).
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The existence of the insanity defense in criminal court is perhaps the
most significant counterpoint to this worry about a factfinder’s ability to
“draw the line” and decide whether or not a tort defendant’s mental illness
contributed—or fully caused—their negligence or intentionally tortious
action. Jurors and judges in criminal court proceedings have been doing
this very thing. They determine whether connection exists between a
mental illness and a particular behavior relevant to a crime.132 Also,
mental health and medical professionals are able to detect when someone
does or does not suffer from a particular mental illness and when a person
is merely malingering, or pretending to have a mental illness.133 Overall,
criminal courts allow mental illness as a defense, and judges and juries
readily make judgments about which defendants qualify for the defense
given the crime charged.134 So why the reluctance to allow civil court
judges and jurors to do the same?
The ability of judges and juries to apply the law to the facts of a
particular case is contingent on the workability of the language of an
affirmative defense and modified reasonable person standard.135 For either
the defense or standard to be “workable,” the language of the jury
instructions and the law on which they’re based must be clear and able to
be applied to a factual scenario. This begs the question: is there legal
language (i.e. jury instructions) that would be conducive to determining if
a defendant lacked the mental capacity to be held fully or partially liable
for their tort? Additionally, is it possible to “draw the line” and determine
whether a person’s mental illness actually caused—either in whole or in
part—their tortious conduct? According to legal and psychological
professionals, should courts even consider the mental state of a tort
defendant? Parts III and IV of this Comment addresses these questions by
surveying mental health professionals and civil attorneys.

132. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 76–78; S IMON, supra note 19, at 176–77; see also AAPL Guidelines
for Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendants, supra note 19.
133. Some have stated that “[s]cientists are between ninety-two and ninety-five percent likely to
identify excessive disability when it is faked.” Criscoe & Lukasik, supra note 9, at 31.
134. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (2011); see State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d 789, 792, 659
P.2d 488, 491 (1983) (applying the NGRI jury instruction).
135. A legislative bill proposing a law must be workable. In re Dependency of J.W.H 106 Wash.
App. 714, 721, 24 P.3d 1105, 1109 (2001) (“The court acknowledged that the intent of the pension
statute was to provide liberally for beneficiaries and to that end, ’the phrase “legal custody” [must]
be given a functional and workable meaning consistent with the purpose and intent of the
pension legislation.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Hanson v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 3d 242,
247, 493 P.2d 775, 778 (1972)), reversed by J.W.H. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 147 Wash. 2d
687, 57 P.3d 266 (2002).
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“The Faultless-but-Guilty” Justification

Between two innocent parties, the party that caused the injury to the
other party should assume the financial burden.136 This is often cited as a
foundational principle of tort law: the person who caused the harm ought
to pay for damage resulting from the harm.137 However, this is limited by
another bedrock principle of tort law: that a defendant is not liable if they
acted reasonably.138 In tort law, liability must only be assigned where fault
is due, not where the actor is not at fault.139 That is, when a defendant acts
reasonably for someone with their same disability or illness, “liability for
harm should not be placed arbitrarily in the lap of the actor with the illness.”140
Additionally, the existence of modified standards for children and
people with physical disabilities contravenes the supposed rationale that
the tort system must hold a person liable merely because they caused harm
to another person—even though they are may actually be at fault due to
their mental illness.141 Some scholars even describe this absence of
consideration for tort defendants with a mental illness as an improper
application of strict liability. 142 For instance, say the defendant in a
negligence suit had acted reasonably for someone with her mental
illness,—and thereby did not breach any duty of care—the defendant can
still be held liable for the harm that resulted from their reasonable actions.
143 Essentially, such a defendant is liable just by virtue of having a mental
illness that they cannot control.144
Importantly, society may actually be more capable of compensating the
plaintiff—for instance through taxes or insurance than a defendant with a
mental illness. This is because some people with mental illnesses may not
be financially equipped to adequately compensate the injured plaintiff. A
majority of people with severe mental illnesses are either entirely or
partially reliant on public assistance for income.145 According to a report
136. See Appelbaum, supra note 9, at 309; Criscoe & Lukasik, supra note 9, at 26; Harlow, supra
note 9, at 1747–48; Korrell, supra note 9, at 27; Splane, supra note 9, at 156, 167.
137. Jankee v. Clark Cty., 612 N.W.2d 297, 312 (Wis. 2000); Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
543 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Wis. 1996); Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 470 (Conn. 1988).
138. Harlow, supra note 9, at 1748–49 (citing Keeton, supra note 56, § 32, at 174–75).
139. Id. at 1748.
140. Id.
141. Kelley, supra note 9, at 180; Korrell, supra note 9, at 23–34.
142. Goldstein, supra note 9 at 75.
143. Id. (noting that this is essentially “strict liability” for having a mental illness).
144. Id.
145. The results of a study of 162 mental patients showed that 70% of the patients relied on public
funds for their living and wellbeing expenses within a year of being released from their medical
treatment facilities. JUDITH BELLIVEAU KRAUS, R.N. & ANN T. SLAVINSKY, R.N., THE
CHRONICALLY ILL PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT AND THE COMMUNITY 83 (1982).
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by the World Health Organization, the “[h]ighest estimated prevalence of
mental disorders can be found among people with the lowest levels of
education or people who are unemployed.”146 Overall, having a mental
disorder increases a person’s likelihood of experiencing poverty.147 The
National Survey of Drug Use and Health reported that approximately 9.8
million adults ages eighteen-years or older in the U.S. had a serious mental
illness in 2016, and 2.5 million of those adults were living below the
poverty line.148 Furthermore, the percentage of adults with mental
illnesses who were unemployed in Washington state was 86.90% in
2012.149 Thus, tort defendants with mental illnesses may not be in a
financial position to personally compensate an injured plaintiff, or even
afford insurance policy could provide such compensation.
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON A MODIFIED NEGLIGENCE
STANDARD AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FOR TORT
DEFENDANTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES
Despite ample scholarship advocating for a modified negligence
standard and/or an affirmative defense to intentional torts for defendants
with mental illnesses,150 no jurisdiction in the United States has adopted
either.151 Why does this incongruity between scholarship and the state of
the law exist? As outlined above, two frequently cited reasons are that such
a standard or defense: (1) may be difficult to administer; and (2) would go
against the principle of tort law that the injured person shall be compensated.
146. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Breaking the Vicious Cycle Between Mental Ill-Health
and Poverty 1 (2007), https://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/development/1_Breakingviciouscy
cle_Infosheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2FV-Q8ER]. For example, “[p]eople with schizophrenia, in
comparison to people without mental disorders, are 4 times more likely to be unemployed or partly
employed.” Id. Additionally, “depression is 1.5 to 2 times more prevalent among the low-income
groups of a population.” Id.
147. Id. at 1.
148. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Results from the
2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables, tbl 8.5A, 8.6A (2016),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015/NSDUH-DetTabs2015/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEN7-V44H].
149. Press Releasee, Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, Mental Illness: NAMI Report Deplores 80
Percent Unemployment Rate (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.nami.org/Press-Media/PressReleases/2014/Mental-Illness-NAMI-Report-Deplores-80-Percent-Une
[https://perma.cc/BC4MTQHX].
150. Appelbaum, supra note 9, at 308; Chriscoe, supra note 9, at 241; Dark, supra note 9, at 169;
Eggen, supra note 9, at 591; Ellis, supra note 9, at 1079; Goldstein, supra note 9, at 67; Harlow, supra
note 9, at 1733; James, supra note 9, at 407; Kelley, supra note 9, at 179; Korrell, supra note 9, at 1;
McKnite, supra note 9, at 1375; Morris, supra note 9, at 1837; Seidelson, supra note 9, at 17.
151. Korrell, supra note 9, at 1 (“[T]he common law has long refused mentally disabled tort
defendants a similar defense. A mentally disabled tort defendant is held to that requisite standard of
care without regard to the disability’s effect on his ability to comply.”).
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This Comment seeks to further understand these administrability/”line
drawing” and “faultless-but-guilty” justifications by proffering and
analyzing novel empirical research. The Author’s research synthesizes
empirical opinion data from mental health professionals and
civil attorneys.
The opinion of mental health professionals on whether a tort
defendant’s mental illness should play a role in a finding of culpability is
highly valuable because mental health professionals’ expert testimony is
required establish an insanity defense152 or diminished capacity153 in
criminal court. Such expert testimony is also sometimes used in tort cases
where the plaintiff is asserting emotional distress claims 154 or particular
susceptibility.155 Given the integral role of mental health professionals in
this process, asking such experts what they think about an affirmative
defense or modified standard in tort law is important to ensure that any
such legislation proposed is scientifically accurate and usable by such
experts.156 Additionally, civil plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys—the very
people who would be advocating for, or opposing, the affirmative defense
and modified standard instructions to the jury—can offer important
insight into whether an affirmative defense and modified standard would
be legally workable.
Opinion data from these two groups of professionals can shed light on
the justifications for maintaining the status quo in tort law. Therefore, the
Author designed and conducted a research study to investigate the
administrability and “faultless-but-guilty” justifications by surveying
mental health professionals and civil attorneys. Overall, survey
participants were asked whether it makes sense—from a mental health or
legal perspective, respectively—to establish an affirmative defense and
152. WASH REV. CODE § 10.77.060 (2016) (“Whenever a defendant has pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity, or there is reason to doubt his or her competency, the court on its own motion or
on the motion of any party shall either appoint or request the secretary to designate a qualified expert
or professional person, who shall be approved by the prosecuting attorney, to evaluate and report upon
the mental condition of the defendant.”).
153. Brett C. Trowbridge, The New Diminished Capacity Defense in Washington, 36 GONZ. L.
REV. 497, 502–04 (2000) (“Thus, it seems clear that after [State v.] Stumpf, expert opinion evidence
would also be required for other mental defenses, such as incompetency, insanity, childhood
incapacity, etc., and lay opinion evidence without expert testimony would also not be allowed.”); see
State v. Stumpf, 64 Wash. App. 522, 524, 827 P.2d 294, 296 (1992).
154. See Kazatsky v. King David Mem’l Park, Inc. 527 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. 1987) (Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress); Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash. 2d 91, 110–12, 26 P.3d 257, 267–
68 (2001) (emotional distress due to a medical procedure).
155. See Lawrence v. TruGreen Landcare, LLC, No. 67245-2-I, 2013 WL 68579, at *5 (Wash. Ct.
App. Jan. 7, 2013) (psychologist’s expert testimony demonstrated that the plaintiff did not have a
preexisting mental health condition).
156. OFFICE OF THE CODE REVISER, Washington State Legislature’s Bill Drafting Guide 1 (2019)
(noting that they “do not do substantive research and will rely on [the bill proposer’s] expertise”).
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modified standard for tort defendants with mental illnesses. Civil attorney
participants were also asked whether they think certain mental illnessbased affirmative defenses and a “reasonable person with the defendant’s
mental illness” negligence standard would be workable in a court of law.
A.

Research Methodology

The research was conducted in the form of two self-report surveys. The
mental health professionals survey (MHPS) was disseminated via the
Qualtrics survey platform,157 and the civil attorney survey (CAS) via the
University of Washington’s Catalyst WebQ platform.158 Sixty-eight
mental health professionals participated in the MHPS, however, 12
participants’ data were dropped because those participants did not
complete the entire survey, rendering the final MHPS data pool a total of
54 participants. Sixty-two attorneys participated the CAS, however, 6
participants’ data were dropped because the participants were not civil
plaintiff or defense attorneys, rendering the final CAS data pool a total of
56 participants.
All mental health professional participants were licensed mental health
professionals, with varying career titles. Of the 54 MHPS participants, the
breakdown of participants’ self-reported “professional title” is as follows:
26 (48%)159 Psychiatrists, 17 (31%) Clinical Psychologists, 6 (11%)
Psychologists, 2 (4%) Master’s Level Clinicians, and 3 (6%) selected the
“Other” option and wrote in their own professional title (two “Forensic
Psychiatrists” and one “Doctoral Level Clinician”). Of the 54 final
participants, 32 are licensed to practice in Washington state, and 24 are
licensed to practice in a U.S. state other than Washington.
All civil attorney participants are licensed attorneys, active members of
the Washington State Bar Association, and have been practicing civil law
in Washington for at least one year. Of the 56 CAS participants, there are
21 (38%) civil defense attorneys, 31 (55%) civil plaintiff attorneys, and 4
(7%) participants identified as both civil defense and plaintiff attorneys.
B.

Mental Health Professional Survey Design

The MHPS contains twelve questions. The first question asks
participants to consent to participating in the study, and questions two
through five are demographic questions. Question six includes a short,

157. QUALTRICS EXPERIENCE MANAGEMENT, https://www.qualtrics.com/
[https://perma.cc/Z3PA-EGSV].
158. WebQ Survey, U. WASH. INFO. TECHNOLOGY, https://itconnect.uw.edu/learn/tools/catalystweb-tools/webq/ [https://perma.cc/U9H8-YYVS].
159. All percentages are reported as rounded to the nearest whole number.

Document1 (Do Not Delete)

138

5/30/2020 10:23 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 95:115

paragraph description of tort law meant to orient the participants and give
them essential background information. This informative paragraph
explains the difference between intentional torts and negligence torts, the
fact that there is currently no affirmative defense for intentional tort
defendants with mental illnesses, nor a modified standard for negligence
tort defendants with mental illnesses. It also provides a brief explanation
about the availability of the affirmative defense of insanity in Washington
state criminal courts. Furthermore, the introductory paragraph explains
one of the current justifications for not allowing a modified standard or
affirmative defense of mental illness: the feared inability of the jury to
“draw the line” and decide whether a defendant’s mental illness in the
particular circumstance affected the defendants’ culpability. The
introductory paragraph also explains to participants that this research
study seeks to investigate this justification by asking mental health
professionals whether they think that a modified standard and affirmative
defense should be implemented in Washington state for tort suits. This
informative paragraph was available for participants to refer to throughout
the remaining survey questions. Participants were required to indicate
whether or not they read the informative paragraph before proceeding to
the subsequent survey questions.
The seventh question then asks participants whether they think a
slightly modified version of the diminished capacity defense should be
available as a defense for intentional tort defendants.160 The eighth
question is similar but asks participants whether they think a slightly
modified version of the insanity defense should be available.161
The ninth question asks participants if a judge or jury should consider
a defendant’s mental illness when that defendant is being sued for
negligence. The tenth question asks participants to select which types of
mental illnesses (if any) they think could be considered when deciding
whether a defendant is guilty of a tort. The types of mental illnesses listed
for participants to choose from are based on the chapter sections in the

160. The exact diminished capacity defense language provided to the participants is as follows:
“Diminished Capacity may be raised as a defense when either specific intent or knowledge is an
element of the crime charged. If specific intent or knowledge is an element, evidence of diminished
capacity can then be considered in determining whether the defendant had the capacity to form the
requisite mental state.” Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC § 18.20.
161. The modified NGRI defense language was taken from the Washington Pattern Jury
Instructions for NGRI. The exact language provided to participants is as follows: “For a defendant to
be found not guilty by reason of insanity you must find that, as a result of mental disease or defect,
the defendant’s mind was affected to such an extent that the defendant was unable to perceive the
nature and quality of the acts with which the defendant is charged or was unable to tell right from
wrong with reference to the particular acts with which the defendant is charged.” Wash. Pattern Jury
Instr. Crim. WPIC § 20.01.
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most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders.162
The eleventh question asked participants about the “sudden mental
incapacitation” defense to negligence, but analyses of responses to this
question have been omitted for reasons beyond the scope of this Comment.
Finally, the twelfth question thanks participants for completing the
survey and permits, but does not require, them to write down any
additional comments, questions, or concerns they may have. Importantly,
all of the questions proceeding the informative paragraph ask, but do not
require, participants to provide qualitive answers along with their selected
answer choice, explaining why they chose the answer they did. The entire
mental health professionals survey questionnaire is located in
Appendix A.
C.

Civil Attorney Survey Design

The CAS contains fifteen questions, first asking participants to consent
to study participation. Questions two through four are demographic
questions–one of which asks participants to indicate whether they are a
civil defense attorney, plaintiff’s attorney, or “other” (if they select
“other” they are asked to write in their title). The survey then proceeds
with an informative, introductory paragraph, explaining that mental
illness is currently not an available affirmative defense to intentional torts,
nor is there a modified standard for negligence defendants with mental
illnesses. This introductory paragraph also explains that if a defense or
modified standard were to be available to tort defendants, it would need
to be “workable.” “Workable” is defined for participants as: “the actual
text describing the defense would need to be something that a jury or judge
could use, in conjunction with the expert testimony of a psychologist or
psychiatrist, to decide whether the defendant’s mental illness is
exculpatory or diminishes the defendant’s liability.” This informative
paragraph is available for participants to refer to throughout the course of
the survey questions. Question number five requires participants to
indicate whether or not they have read the informative paragraph before
proceeding to the subsequent survey questions.
The sixth question proposes the same diminished capacity defense
language as was proposed in the mental health professionals’ survey, but
with additional text about specifically when the diminished capacity jury

162. Examples of the types listed are “Depressive Disorders,” “Obsessive-Compulsive and Related
Disorders,” “Bipolar and Related Disorders,” “Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic
Disorders,” and “Anxiety Disorders.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
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instruction would be submitted to the jury.163 Participants are asked
whether they think the diminished capacity defense should be available to
intentional tort defendants with mental illnesses.
The seventh question then asks whether the diminished capacity
defense would be “workable” in a court of law. Again, “workable,” in this
sense, refers to whether the jury (or judge) could use the expert testimony
of a mental health professional, in addition to the facts of a case, to decide
whether a defendant qualifies for the diminished capacity defense.
The eighth question proposes the same NGRI-based jury instruction as
that of the MHPS and asks participants whether they think it should be an
available defense for intentional torts. The ninth question then queries
whether participants think the NGRI defense language would be workable
in a court of law. Question ten participants to indicate if they think the
“reasonable person with the defendant’s mental illness” standard should
be available for negligent tort defendants with mental illnesses. Question
eleven follows and queries whether this modified standard would be
workable in a court of law. The twelfth question is identical to the sudden
mental incapacitation question (question eleven) in the MHPS. But, again,
analyses of the responses to this question have been omitted for reasons
beyond the scope of this Comment.
Questions thirteen and fourteen ask participants to indicate how many
defendants (if any) they have represented or opposed in their years as
practicing attorneys, whom they believe would have qualified for an
affirmative defense of mental illness, and how many they think should
have been evaluated based on the modified reasonable person standard.
The final, fifteenth question is identical to the last question in the
MHPS—thanking the participants for their time and allowing them a
chance to write down any comments, questions, or concerns they had
about the survey. Similar to the MHPS, all of the questions proceeding the
informative paragraph ask, but do not mandate, participants to provide
qualitive answers along with their selected answer choice. The entire CAS
questionnaire is located in Appendix B.

163. The survey excerpt on when to submit Diminished Capacity instruction to the jury is adapted
from the section 18.20 of the Washington Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions. Wash. Pattern Jury Instr.
Crim. WPIC § 18.20. The modification is minimal, however, as the only changes are substituting the
word “tort” for “crime” and “tort alleged” for “crime alleged.” Specifically, the survey states: The
Diminished Capacity “pattern instruction may be submitted to the jury only if the defendant satisfies
the following three requirements: (1) the tort must include a particular mental state as an element; (2)
the defendant must present evidence of a mental disorder; and (3) expert testimony must logically and
reasonably connect the defendant’s alleged mental condition with the asserted inability to form the
mental state required for the tort alleged.”
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The majority of MHPS participants reported that the diminished capacity
defense, insanity defense, and modified negligence standard should all be
available to tort defendants with mental illnesses. The majority distribution
was statistically significant for the diminished capacity and insanity
defense, but not for the modified negligence standard.
In response to the question of whether diminished capacity should be
an available affirmative defense to intentional torts, 32 (59%) mental
health professional participants reported “yes,” 13 (24%) reported
“maybe/I don’t know,” and 9 (17%) reported “no.” The distribution of
answers to the insanity defense question was similar, with 30 (56%) “yes”
responses, 13 (24%) “maybe/I don’t know” responses, and 11 (20%) “no”
responses. When asked whether there should be a modified negligence
standard for defendants with mental illnesses, the number of “yes”
responses dropped slightly to 25 (46%), with 17 (32%) reporting “maybe/I
don’t know,” and 11 (20%) reporting “no.”164
The limited range for the response options (“yes,” “no,” or “maybe”)
warranted the use of nonparametric analysis: Chi-square goodness-of-fit
tests165 were applied to test whether participants’ answer choices differed
from a chance distribution (i.e. one-third of participants choosing “yes,”
one-third choosing “no,” and one-third choosing “maybe”). Chi square
goodness-of-fit tests were run on each, substantive question in the MHPS:
the diminished capacity, insanity defense, and modified negligence
standard questions. Additionally, a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test was
used to assess the significance of the DSM question, synthesizing the
response options—for analysis purposes—into whether the participants
indicated that “none,” “all,” or “some” of the DSM mental illness types
could (depending on the situation) contribute to tort liability. This totaled
to five Chi-Square goodness-of-fit tests.
The Chi-square tests revealed that participant’s choices were different
from the chance distribution (i.e. one-third of participants choosing “yes,”
one-third choosing “no,” and one-third choosing “maybe”) for the
164. The reason the percentages do not add up to 100% is because one participant did not answer
this question.
165. A Chi-Square goodness-of-fit test is a test for statistical significance used to determine how
the observed value of a given occurrence is significantly different from the expected value of the
occurrence.
Chi
Square
Goodness
of
Fit
Test,
STAT. SOLUTIONS (2019),
https://www.statisticssolutions.com/chi-square-goodness-of-fit-test/ [https://perma.cc/5243-UF4T] .
For the purposes of the present research, the “observed value” is how many participants chose a
particular answer to a question (i.e., “yes,” “maybe/I don’t know,” or “no”). Because there are three
answer choices, the “expected value” is that one-third of participants would choose each answer.

Document1 (Do Not Delete)

142

5/30/2020 10:23 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 95:115

diminished capacity, insanity defense, and DSM questions, but not
significantly different from chance distribution for the modified negligence
standard question (non-significant results are indicated with a *):
Diminished Capacity, 2 (2, N = 54) = 16.95, p = .00021
Insanity Defense, 2 (2, N = 54) = 12.24, p = .0022
*Mental Illness Negligence Standard, 2 (2, N = 54) = 5.647, p = .05941
DSM Mental Illnesses, 2 (2, N = 54) = 19.310, p = .00006
The distribution of participants’ responses for the diminished capacity,
insanity defense, and DSM questions was significant at a p value of <.05.
Therefore, the fact that the majority of participants chose “yes,” and the
margin by which “yes” was the majority answer is statistically significant.
Alternately, the distribution of participants’ responses for the
Negligence Standard question was not significant at a p value of >.05. So,
while the majority of participants indicated that “yes” there should be a
Negligence Standard for people with mental illnesses, the margin by
which “yes” was the majority is not significant.
2.

MHPS Qualitative166 Data

To analyze the qualitative responses accompanying “yes” or “no”
answers to the diminished capacity, insanity defense, negligence standard,
and SMI questions, the Author coded the text written by the participants
and categorized their qualitative responses into one of two categories: (1)
the affirmative defense/modified negligence standard makes logical sense
from a psychological or medical perspective (“category 1”)167; (2) or the
affirmative defense/modified negligence standard does not make sense
because mental illness does not cause, is no excuse for, or does not
preclude responsibility for, tortious conduct (“category 2”).168 Note that

166. “Qualitative data describes qualities or characteristics. It is collected using questionnaires,
interviews, or observation, and frequently appears in narrative form. For example, it could be notes
taken during a focus group on the quality of the food at [a café], or responses from an open-ended
questionnaire. Qualitative data may be difficult to precisely measure and analyze. The data may be in
the form of descriptive words that can be examined for patterns or meaning, sometimes through the
use of coding. Coding allows the researcher to categorize qualitative data to identify themes that
correspond with the research questions and to perform quantitative analysis.” Quantitative vs.
Qualitative
Data,
RES.
GUIDES
(Nov.
8,
2019),
https://libguides.macalester.edu/c.php?g=527786&p=3608639 [https://perma.cc/8DGU-XW6H].
167. An example of one participant’s response that falls within category 1 is “[s]pecific intent is
something that would be particularly impaired with various mental illnesses related to impulse control
difficulties, reality testing difficulties, or cognitive trouble. I also think that if it is available as a
defense in the criminal court I don’t understand why it wouldn’t be in civil court.”
168. An example of one participant’s response that falls within category 2 is “mental illness doesn’t
preclude anyone from responsibility or being a responsible citizen. Part of their responsibility would
be getting help or medication for their mental illness so negligent things wouldn’t happen, if their
illness is severe enough. Again, this would stigmatize mental health if used as a defense.”
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the qualitative responses were optional and therefore not every participant
provided responses. Also note that not every response fell within one of
the two categories.
Twenty-six participants answered “yes” and included a qualitative
response to the diminished capacity question. All 26 of these “yes”
responses included category 1 explanations—that the diminished capacity
defense makes sense from a psychological perspective. Alternately, while
7 participants answered “no” and provided a qualitative response, only 2
of these responses included category 2 explanations for their “no”—that
such a defense is illogical because mental illness does not cause or is no
excuse for tortious conduct. For the insanity defense question, 47
participants wrote qualitative responses. Twenty-five participants
answered “yes” and included a qualitative response, of which 24 were
classified as category 1. Alternately, while 9 participants answered “no”
and included a qualitative response, only 2 included category 2 responses.
Thus, the large majority of the mental health professionals who answered
“yes” to the diminished capacity and insanity defense questions did so
because they believe that the affirmative defenses make sense
psychologically and/or medically (81% for diminished capacity, and 80%
for insanity defense).169
Even though the distribution was not significant, the Author also coded
the qualitative responses to the negligence standard question and, again,
found that the majority of participants reported “yes” because they believe
the standard and defense cohere with modern psychological knowledge
(15 out of the 25 “yes” responses to the negligence standard question were
category 1). Furthermore, very few of the participants who responded
“no” did so because they do not think mental illness affects, or should
affect, negligence liability (3 out of the 11 “no” responses to the
negligence standard question were category 2).
Overall, the data show that mental health professional participants
significantly support the implementation of a mental illness defense to
intentional torts. More specifically, the qualitative responses suggest that
most participants support a Diminished Capacity and Insanity Defense
because those defenses make sense given modern day psychological and
medical knowledge about the human mind. Furthermore, very few
participants were against the defenses for the reason that they do not make
sense psychologically or medically. Although the majority of participants
technically also supported a mental illness negligence standard, no
inferences can be drawn from the numbers as they are not significant.
Even so, the majority of participants who supported the modified standard
169. For diminished capacity: 32 total participants answered “yes,” and 26 of these included
category 1 responses; this equals 81%. For insanity defense: 30 total participants answered “yes,” and
24 of these included category 1 responses; this equals 80%.
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did so because it makes sense psychologically and/or medically. And,
again, only a small minority of participants who did not support the
modified standard chose “no” because they thought mental illness does
not, or should not, psychologically affect a defendant’s negligence
liability. Finally, participants also significantly reported that some or all
types of mental illnesses in the DSM could indeed be the basis for a mental
illness defense in civil suits.
E.

Analysis of the Civil Attorney Survey Data

1.

CAS Quantitative Data

Unlike mental health professionals, the majority of civil attorneys
indicated they do not think a diminished capacity defense, insanity
defense, or modified negligence standard should be available for tort
defendants with mental illnesses. An analysis of the CAS participant data
for each defense is detailed below.
When asked about diminished capacity as a defense to intentional torts,
31 (55%) participants reported “no”—that they do not think it should be
an available defense—, 16 (29%) reported “yes,” and 9 (16%) reported
“maybe/I don’t know.” However, when asked whether a diminished
capacity defense would be workable in a court of law, 23 (41%) indicated
“yes,” 22 (39%) “no,” and 11 “(20%) maybe/I don’t know.” So, even
though only 16 (29%) participants believed the diminished capacity
defense should be available, 23 (41%) participants said it was
conceptually workable.
For the insanity defense questions, 32 (57%) participants indicated that
it should not be an available defense, 13 (23%) reported “yes,” and 11
(20%) reported “maybe/I don’t know.” The distribution was somewhat
parallel when asked whether the insanity defense would be workable: 26
(46%) participants said “no,” 17 (30%) “yes,” and 13 (23%) “maybe/I
don’t know.”
When asked whether a modified standard should be used to evaluate
defendants with mental illnesses in negligence suits, 47 (84%) participants
indicated “no,” 5 (9%) “yes,” and 4 (7%) “maybe/I don’t know.” Again,
the distribution for the question of workability was somewhat parallel,
albeit more participants thought the standard would be workable than
thought it should be applied in a court of law. That is, 38 (68%)
participants said a modified mental illness standard would not be
workable, 11 (20%) said “yes,” and 7 (13%) said “no.”
Lastly, in response to the question about how many of their past clients
do participants believe would have qualified for either the insanity or
diminished capacity affirmative defense, 32 (57%) said they had not
encountered any such clients, 17 (30%) said they had encountered one-to-
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ten, 1 (2%) participant said ten-to-twenty, one indicated forty-to-fifty, and
5 (9%) participants did not report a number. In response to this same
question, but about the modified negligence standard, 41 (73%) said they
had not encountered any clients that would have qualified for a modified
negligence standard, 11 (20%) said one-to-ten clients, 1 (2%) participant
indicated twenty-to-thirty, and 3 (5%) participants declined to report a
numerical quantity.
As with the MHPS, the limited range for the response options (“yes,”
“no,” or “maybe”) warranted the use of nonparametric analysis: Chisquare goodness-of-fit tests were used to test whether participants’ answer
choices differed from a chance distribution (i.e. one-third of participants
choosing “yes,” one-third choosing “no,” and one-third choosing
“maybe”). Chi square goodness-of-fit tests were run on each, substantive
question in the CAS: the Diminished Capacity, Insanity Defense,
Modified Reasonable Person, and Mental Illness Negligence Standard
questions, the respective “workability” questions, and the question about
the number of participants’ clients who may have qualified for either a
mental illness-based affirmative defense or modified negligence standard.
This totaled to nine chi-square analyses.
The Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests revealed that participant’s choices
were different from the chance distribution for each question except for
the question on Diminished Capacity workability (non-significant
indicated with a *):
Diminished Capacity, 2 (2, N = 56) = 13.68, p = .001
*Diminished Capacity workability, 2 (2, N = 56) = 4.80, p = .091
Insanity Defense, 2 (2, N = 56) = 14.54, p <.001
Insanity Defense workability, 2 (2, N = 56) = 4.80, p = .091
Mental Illness Negligence Standard, 2 (2, N = 56) = 65.19,
p <.00001
Mental Illness Negligence Standard workability, 2 (2, N = 56) =
30.78, p <.00001
Number Affirmative Defense Clients, 2 (2, N = 56) = 63.818,
p = <.00001
Number of Modified Negligence Standard Clients, 2 (2, N = 56)
= 73.429, p = <.00001
The distribution of participants’ responses for each question—except
the diminished capacity workability question—was significant at a p
value of <.05. Therefore, the fact that the majority of participants chose
“no,” and the margin by which “no” was the majority answer is
statistically significant. According to the Chi square tests, it is also
significant that the majority of participants indicated they had not
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encountered any clients whom they believe would have qualified for
either an affirmative defense of mental illness or a modified negligence
standard. Overall, the data show that civil attorney participants
significantly renounce mental illness as an available defense to intentional
torts, or a modified, reasonable person standard in tort law.
2.

CAS Qualitative Data

To analyze the qualitative responses accompanying the “yes” or “no”
answers to the diminished capacity, insanity defense, and modified
negligence standard questions,170 the Author coded the participants’
written text and categorized the responses into one of four categories.
“Yes” responses with an explanation indicating that participants believe
the affirmative defense/modified negligence standard makes logical sense
from a legal perspective were labeled as “category A”.171 “No” responses
accompanied by a qualitative “faultless-but-guilty” justification172—per
the over-arching principle of tort law, the person who caused the harm
must compensate the injured—were labeled as “category B.”173 And “no”
responses accompanied by a qualitative “administrability”
justification174—concern that a jury or judge will not be able to determine
whether a defendant’s mental illness contributed to their actions, and/or
concern that the affirmative defense/negligence standard would
unnecessarily expend judicial resources, increase litigation costs, etc.—
were labeled as “category C.”175 Finally, “no” responses that were a
combination of category B and C were labeled as “category D.”176
Fourteen participants answered “yes” to the “should diminished
capacity be an available defense to an intentional tort” question and
included a qualitative response, 13 of these “yes” responses were
170. While the survey included qualitative answer options to almost all the questions, for the
purposes of this Comment the most relevant responses are to the Dim Cap, Insanity Defense, and
Modified Negligence Standard questions.
171. An example of one participant’s category A response is “[i]ntentional Torts-by
definition-require an intent. If someone cannot formulate an intent to injure, they shouldn’t be liable
for an intentional tort.”
172. See supra section II.A.1.
173. An example of one participant’s category B response is “[t]he purpose of criminal law is to
punish people . . . the purpose of civil law is to compensate people who have suffered damages at the
hands of another purpose. I am not sure why the victim of a tort should have to bear the consequences
of another person’s mental illness. Maybe there are good reasons, but I would have to be convinced.”
174. See supra section II.A.8.
175. An example of one participant’s category C response is “[t]his will give plaintiff’s another
opportunity to scam the system, require more experts, increasing costs, and confuse the burden of proof.”
176. An example of one participant’s category D response is “a sliding scale of responsibility is
fraught with ambiguities, which would 1) prevent compensation for innocent victims, 2) creat[e] such
confusion as to be unworkable.”
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accompanied by a qualitative category A explanation. Thus, the large
majority (93%)177 of participants who answered “yes” and included a
qualitative response did so because they believe the diminished capacity
defense makes sense from a legal perspective. Alternately, while 28
participants answered “no” to the diminished capacity question and
included a qualitative response, 13 of the responses were category B, 6
were category C, and 2 were category D. Thus, the majority (75%) of “no”
response justifications fell into applied either the “faultless-but-guilty”
justification, the “administrability” justification, or both.178
Eight participants answered “yes” to the “should the Insanity Defense
be an available defense to an intentional tort?” question and included a
qualitative response. All eight of these “yes” responses were accompanied
by a qualitative category A explanation. Thus, every participant (100%)
who answered “yes” and included a qualitative response did so because
they believe the Insanity Defense makes sense from a legal perspective.
Alternately, while 28 participants answered “no” to the Insanity Defense
question and included a qualitative response, 15 of the responses were
Category B, 4 were Category C, and 3 were Category D. Thus, the
majority of “no” response justifications fell into applied either the
“faultless-but-guilty” justification, the “administrability” justification, or
both (79%).179 Again, note that the qualitative responses were optional
and therefore not every participant provided responses. Also note that not
every response qualified under the above categories.
Only two participants answered “yes” and included a qualitative
response to the question of “should there be a modified negligence
standard for tort defendants with mental illnesses?” Both of these “yes”
responses were accompanied by a qualitative category A explanation.
Thus, each participant who answered “yes” and included a qualitative
response did so because they believe the “modified person with the
defendant’s mental illness” negligence standard makes sense from a legal
perspective. Alternately, while 41 participants answered “no” to the insanity
defense question and included a qualitative response, 12 of the responses
were category B, 12 were category C, and 4 were category D. Thus, the
majority (68%)180 of “no” responses were forms of either the “faultless-butguilty” justification, the “administrability” justification, or both.
Overall, the qualitative data from the CAS evinces civil attorney
participants’ opposition to a diminished capacity defense, insanity
defense, and modified negligence standard. Specifically, the qualitative

177.
178.
179.
180.

Thirteen out of fourteen participants equals 93%.
Twenty-one out of twenty-eight participants equals 75%.
Twenty-two out of twenty-eight participants equals 79%.
Twenty-eight out of forty-one participants equals 68%.
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responses suggest that this opposition is largely rooted in the “faultlessbut-guilty” and “administrability” justifications.
3.

Civil Plaintiff Attorneys Versus Civil Defense Attorneys

An additional question to consider is whether a participant’s status as a
civil plaintiff versus civil defense attorney may affect whether a
participant supports or opposes a defense/standard, or thinks a
defense/standard would be workable. To answer this question, the Author
applied a one-tailed z-test for two population proportions. This type of ztest is used when a researcher wants to know whether two populations or
groups (defense attorneys and plaintiff attorneys) differ significantly on a
single, categorical characteristic (whether or not they answered yes, no,
or maybe to the diminished capacity, insanity defense, and negligence
standard questions).181 The results of the z-tests indicated a significant
relationship between a participant’s status as a defense versus plaintiff
attorney and their answer choice for only three types of responses (nonsignificant relationships are indicted with a “*”):
*Diminished Capacity “yes”: z-score = -1.495, p = .068
*Diminished Capacity “maybe”: z-score = -1.386, p = .082
Diminished Capacity “no”: z-score = 2.354, p = .009
*Insanity Defense “yes”: z-score = -0.774, p = .221
*Insanity Defense “maybe”: z-score = -1.02, p = 0.154
*Insanity Defense “no”: z-score = 1.451, p = 0.073
Modified Negligence Standard “yes”: z-score = -1.899, p = 0.029
*Modified Negligence Standard “maybe”: z-score = -1.469, p = 0.071
Modified Negligence Standard “no”: z-score = 2.169, p = 0.015
These data demonstrate the difference is significant between the number
of civil defense attorneys versus plaintiff attorneys who answered “no” to
the diminished capacity question. This means that significantly more civil
plaintiff attorneys were against the diminished capacity defense. This
difference is also significant for those who answered “yes” and “no” to the
modified negligence standard question. For all other question-response
combinations, the plaintiff/defense distinction was not significant.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE SURVEY RESULTS
The MHPS and CAS data indicate a significant divide between the
opinions of mental health professionals the opinions of civil attorneys. Mental
health professionals believe that courts should consider a tort defendant’s

181. Z Score Calculator for 2 Population Proportions, SOCIAL SCIENCE STATISTICS,
https://www.socscistatistics.com/tests/ztest/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/UT7P-U2X3].
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mental illness in intentional tort suits,182 while civil attorneys disapprove of
such consideration for both intentional torts and negligence.183
A.

Mental Health Professionals Support Some Mental Illness
Defenses to Intentional Torts

The results of the MHPS suggest that experts in the mental health field
support the implementation of a mental illness-based affirmative defense
to intentional torts. The majority of MHPS participants indicated they
believe a diminished capacity defense, insanity defense, and modified
negligence standard should be available to tort defendants with mental
illness (albeit the majority margin was not significant for the modified
negligence standard). The qualitative responses shed light on the rationale
behind the MHPS participants’ opinions in two, important ways. First, the
responses indicate that the primary reason the mental health professionals
supported the defenses/standard is because they make sense from a
psychological/medical perspective—that is, the defenses/standard
conform with what modern psychology and medicine has taught us about
the human mind. Second, the mental health professionals rarely opposed
the defenses/standard because they believe mental illness does not, or
should not, contribute to tort liability from a psychological or medical
perspective.
Additionally, the MHPS results demonstrate that the majority of mental
health professionals surveyed believe that multiple mental illnesses in the
DSM could qualify an individual for a modified negligence standard or a
diminished capacity/insanity defense in conjunction with the facts of a
particular case.
In sum, these data from mental health professionals rebut the notion
that the court and jury will have trouble “drawing the line” in intentional
tort suits—that is, distinguishing/deciding whether a defendant’s mental
illness should be exculpatory or limit liability. The very people whose
testimony would be relied upon to help “draw the line”—mental health
professional expert witnesses—believe that mental illness could affect a
defendant’s tortious culpability and that a diminished capacity defense or
insanity defense should be available for intentional torts. The opinion of
these mental health professionals is highly valuable because they are
tasked with explaining the relevant information about the defendant to the
factfinder in court.184 This support for the consideration of tort defendants’
182. See supra section III.D.
183. See supra section III.E.
184. See, e.g. Colleen M. Berryessa, Educator of the Court: The Role of Expert Witnesses in Cases
Involving Autism Spectrum Disorder, 23 PSYCHOL. CRIME L. 575, 575 (2017) (“The role of the expert
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mental illnesses, however, is not matched in the civil attorneys’ responses
to the CAS questions.
B.

Civil Attorneys Do Not Support Consideration of a Tort
Defendant’s Mental Illness

Like mental health professionals, civil attorneys also provide an
important perspective on the potential for mental illness-based defenses
and a modified negligence standard. As the advocates tasked with
propounding or contending a defense or legal standard in court, the civil
attorney participants were able to opine on the workability of such
defenses and modified standard. The results from the CAS suggest that
civil attorneys do not support an insanity defense, diminished capacity
defense, or a modified negligence standard in tort suits. Additionally, the
majority of CAS participants stated they did not think the insanity defense
or modified negligence standard would be workable in a court of law.
However, although a slight majority reported that the diminished capacity
defense would not be workable, this distribution was insignificant and
therefore no factual conclusions can be drawn from the diminished
capacity workability question data. This leaves open the possibility that
while civil attorneys do not believe the diminished capacity defense
should be available to civil defendants, they may believe that it could be.
Also noteworthy—but not statistically significant—is the fact that
fewer participants indicated “no” to the workability questions than to the
questions about whether each defense/standard should available to
defendants. For the diminished capacity questions, 31 participants
indicated it should not be available, but only 22 indicated it would not be
workable. For the insanity defense questions, 32 participants thought it
should not be available, but only 26 said it would be unworkable. For the
modified negligence standard questions, 47 indicated it should not be an
available standard, yet only 38 indicated it would not be workable. This
uneven distribution could be interpreted as an indication that there are
some civil attorneys who believe that mental illness should not be a
defense to intentional torts for policy reasons, but that if it were, the
factfinder (be it a judge or jury) would be able to apply the proposed
language to the facts of a case and successfully evaluate a defendant’s
liability. Although this supposition is just conjecture, as the CAS did not
produce statistically significant data, it sheds light on a future direction
for more research. Answering this question of why attorneys think a
defense/standard would be workable but still do not support its
implementation would require further research on more participants who
witness in legal contexts is to educate fact finders of the court who may have no background in the
expert’s area.”).
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select “no” for the question of availability but select “maybe” or “yes” for
the question of workability.
The qualitative responses help to explain the civil attorney participants’
opinions because they demonstrate that the “administrative” and
“faultless-but-guilty” justifications were the most common reasons for
attorneys opposing the intentional tort defenses and modified negligence
standard. Additionally, while only a small number of attorney participants
supported the defenses and negligence standard, nearly all these attorneys’
qualitative responses included language indicating that they believed the
defenses/standard made sense from a legal perspective.
C.

Plaintiff Attorneys Are More Likely to Oppose a Diminished
Capacity Defense and a Modified Negligence Standard

Plaintiff versus defense attorneys differed significantly when
answering the question of whether the diminished capacity defense and
modified negligence standard should be available to tort defendants with
a mental illness. It was statistically significant that 22 plaintiff attorneys
but only 8 defense attorneys reported “no” to the diminished capacity
availability question. Additionally, the difference between plaintiff versus
defense attorneys who reported “yes” and “no” to the modified negligence
standard question was also statistically significant. That is, significantly
more plaintiff attorneys than defense attorneys reported they do not
support a modified negligence standard for tort defendants with a mental
illness (29 plaintiff, 15 defense). On the flip side, significantly more
defense attorneys than plaintiff attorneys reported they do support a
modified negligence standard for tort defendants with a mental illness (4
defense, 1 plaintiff). These data suggest that plaintiff attorneys are
significantly more likely than defense attorneys to oppose both the
diminished capacity defense and a modified negligence standard, while
defense attorneys are significantly more likely to support a modified
negligence standard. This information is not surprising given the attorneys
positional differences in litigation, but also suggests that the CAS
participants’ responses could be influenced by their status as a defense or
plaintiff attorney.
D.

Comparison Between Mental Health Professionals and Civil
Attorneys

Given this drastic discrepancy between the CAS and MHPS results,
what is to be done? Who should we believe: the mental health
professionals—the people who would likely serve as expert witnesses in
civil suits involving a defendant with a mental illness—or the civil
attorneys—the people tasked with arguing for or against a mental illness-
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based defense or negligence standard? Who should the courts and
legislature listen to? The results of this research seem to address why
substantial scholarship calls for the implementation of a mental illness
negligence standard and an insanity/diminished capacity defense to
intentional torts, yet no state in the U.S. has established such common law
or passed such legislation. Civil courts are either knowingly or
unknowingly ignoring the science behind mental illness. While this
research demonstrates that, from a psychological perspective, some
mental illnesses can mitigate tort liability, it is clear that attorneys
nonetheless do not think the court should consider a defendant’s mental
illness in a tort suit. Furthermore, while attorneys do not believe an
insanity or diminished capacity defense standard would be “workable” in
a court of law and oppose it on “administrability” and “faultless-butguilty” grounds, mental health professionals believe that the proposed
affirmative defenses are necessary given the psychological effects of
mental illness. Overall, the data from this research is inherently
contradictory. The MHPS data show that mental health professionals
believe it is possible to “draw the line” for intentional torts: they support
the implementation of a mental illness-based affirmative defense and can
even postulate which mental illnesses in the DSM may contribute to a
defendant’s tortious actions. The CAS data, on the other hand, indicate
that civil attorneys do not support mental illness as an affirmative defense
to intentional torts or a modified negligence standard and maintain that
either defense or standard would be legally unworkable.
The data from this research will hopefully provide future tort
lawmakers with important information that frames issue as a choice
between two pools of knowledge: Should tort law incorporate modern
medical and psychological knowledge about people with mental illnesses,
or should it discount such information in the interest of maintaining
traditional tort principles and avoiding potential administrability issues?
To side with the mental health professionals would be to bypass concerns
about legal workability and policy, but to side with the civil attorneys
would be to ignore modern psychology. Must tort low evolve alongside
developments in medicine and social sciences? Psychologist and
psychiatrists think it should, but civil attorneys are not convinced.
CONCLUSION
Despite ample scholarship advocating for an affirmative defense or
modified negligence standard for tort defendants with mental illnesses, no
jurisdiction in the United States has established either. Rather, court
opinions continue to justify the lack of an affirmative defense or modified
standard, often by citing either “administrability” or “faultless-but-guilty”
grounds. For instance, Justice Cox of the Washington Court of Appeals
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explained in Ramey v. Knorrthat Washington state rejects a modified
negligence standard in part because “the existence and degree of one’s
mental illness can be difficult to measure” and because of “the difficulty
of drawing a line between mental illness and variations of temperaments,
intellect, and emotional balance.”185 While critics of the justifications
have offered rebuttals to each one, this Comment includes novel,
qualitative and quantitative data that sheds light on the “administrability”
justification and the “faultless-but-guilty” justification. The
administrability/line-drawing justification is repudiated by the existence
of the insanity and diminished defenses in Washington state, and by the
existence of a modified standard for children and people with physical
disabilities. This Comment adds to these rebuttals by providing novel
empirical research. The research demonstrates that mental health
professionals endorse the adoption of an affirmative defense for
intentional tort defendants with mental illness, but also raises the concern
that civil attorneys believe such a defense would be unworkable in a court
of law. Mental health professionals who participated in the Author’s
research support the adoption of a mental illness-based affirmative
defense in Washington state, and were also able to posit which mental
illnesses may qualify a defendant to assert an affirmative defense or apply
a modified negligence standard. Civil attorney participants, however,
opined that a mental illness-based affirmative defense or negligence
standard would not be “workable” in a court of law and opposed on both
“faultless-but-guilty” and “administrability” grounds. This discrepancy
begs the question: Should Washington state tort law reflect the opinions
of mental health practitioners or civil attorneys? Psychology and
medicine, or legal logistics and tradition? The choice is one of
inconvenient change versus convenient stagnation.

185. 130 Wash. App. at 674–75, 124 P.3d at 317 (“Both for historical and other reasons, insanity
or other mental deficiencies generally are not recognized as defenses to negligence.
Washington . . . holds the mentally ill to the standard of a reasonable person under like
circumstances.”).
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Appendix A
Mental Health Professional Survey
Tort defendants with Mental Illnesses
Q1 Welcome to the research survey!
We are interested in the possibility of mental illness as a defense that
either decreases or exculpates a defendant’s liability in Washington state
tort suits. Tort law is a section of the civil legal system that addresses
liability for accidental or intentional legal wrongs that result in harm to a
private party, such as negligence, assault, or battery. Prior to answering
any survey questions, you will be presented with information about
mental health and tort law. You will then be asked your professional
opinion about defendants with mental illnesses who are being sued in civil
court
for
committing
a
tort
in
Washington
state.
By completing this survey, you are consenting to participate in this study
and consenting to the potential use of your survey responses in the
researcher’s Washington Law Review article. However, your responses
will be kept anonymous, confidential, and in no way connected to your
name, email address, or other directly-identifying information.
The study should take you around 10-20 minutes to complete. Your
participation in this research is voluntary. You have the right to stop the
survey at any point, for any reason, and without any prejudice. If you
would like to contact the Principal Investigator in the study to discuss this
research, please e-mail Gabrielle Lindquist at lindqg@uw.edu.
By clicking the button below, you acknowledge that your participation in
the study is voluntary, that you are at least 18 years of age, and that you
are aware that you may choose to terminate your participation in the
survey at any time and for any reason (just exit the survey on your
computer).
Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop
computer. Some features may be less compatible for use on a mobile
device.
• I consent, begin the study
• I do not consent, I do not wish to participate
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Q2 Please select the professional title that applies to you:
• Psychiatrist
• Clinical Psychologist
• Psychologist
• Social Worker
• Master’s Level Clinician
• Therapist
• Other (please explain): ___________________________________
Q3 What is your educational background?
• I have an M.D. in Psychiatry.
• I have a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology
• I have a Psy.D.
• I have a Master’s in Psychology or a related mental health field
(please specify the exact degree title here): _______________________
• Other (please explain): ___________________________________
Q4 I am a licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health counselor,
social worker, or therapist in Washington state.
• Yes
• No
• Other (please explain): ___________________________________
Q5 I have been a psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health counselor,
social worker, or therapist in Washington state for:
• less than 1 year
• 1 to 5 years
• 5 to 10 years
• more than 10 years
• Other (please explain): ___________________________________
Q6 PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
CAREFULLY, as it will be necessary to answer all further survey
questions:
What is a tort?
“Torts” are wrongful acts for which the wrongdoer can be sued in civil
court—as opposed to criminally prosecuted by the government. Civil
court cases are about the defendant paying money damages for harm they
caused to a private party, unlike criminal court where the
state/government is party bringing the suit against the defendant. Some
examples of torts are: someone driving their car while distracted
(negligence), someone trespassing on another person’s land (trespass),
someone shoving another person from behind (battery), or someone
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verbally threatening another person to the point that the other person
believes
they
may
be
harmed
(assault).
Tort law does not take into consideration a defendant’s mental illness:
Mental illness is not currently available as a defense for people who are
being sued for torts. That is, if someone with a mental illness is being sued
for battery or assault in civil court, for instance, they cannot cite to their
mental illness as a reason why they were unable to control their behavior
or unable to know what they were doing. In criminal court, however,
defendants can cite to their mental illness as a defense. That is, criminal
defendants can argue that, because of their mental illness, they didn’t
know what they were doing and therefore cannot be responsible (either
fully
or
partially)
for
their
crime.
Additionally, when a person with a mental illness is sued for negligence,
the jury is asked to decide if that defendant acted like an “objectively
reasonable person” (without a mental illness). If the defendant acted
“objectively unreasonable,” then they are found to be guilty of negligence.
Even if the defendant has a mental illness, the jury or judge is not allowed
to consider their mental illness when deciding whether the defendant acted
negligently and should be found guilty.
We want your opinion:
The next few pages of this survey will ask your opinion about whether
you think a defendant’s mental illness should be an available defense,
and/or at least considered, when a judge or jury decides whether a
defendant is guilty of a tort.
*You can scroll back up to this information at any time while you are
answering the remaining questions on this page of the survey.
Please indicate below if you have read the above information:
• Yes, I have read it.
• No, I did not read it.
Q7 In your opinion, should the following defense be an option for
defendants with mental illnesses who are being sued for a tort such as
battery, trespass, or assault?
This proposed defense is modeled on the current “Diminished
Capacity” affirmative defense that Washington state currently allows
in criminal prosecutions:
“Diminished Capacity may be raised as a defense when either specific
intent or knowledge is an element of the tort. If specific intent or
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knowledge is an element, evidence of diminished capacity can then be
considered in determining whether the defendant had the capacity to
form the knowledge or intent.”
• Yes, I think this defense should be available (please explain why):
________________________________________________
• No, I do not think this defense should be available (please explain
why): ________________________________________________
• Maybe/I
don’t
know
(please
explain
why):
________________________________________________
Q8 In your opinion, should the following defense be an option for
defendants with mental illnesses who are being sued for a tort such as
battery, trespass, or assault?
This proposed defense is modeled on the “Insanity Defense” jury
instructions that Washington state currently allows in criminal
prosecutions:
“For a defendant to be found not guilty by reason of insanity you must
find that, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant’s mind
was affected to such an extent that the defendant was unable to
perceive the nature and quality of the acts with which the defendant
is charged or was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to
the particular acts with which the defendant is charged.”
• Yes, I think this defense should be available (please explain why):
________________________________________________
• No, I do not think this defense should be available (please explain
why): ________________________________________________
• Maybe/I
don’t
know
(please
explain
why):
________________________________________________
Q9 In your opinion, should a judge or jury consider a defendant’s
mental illness when that defendant is being sued for negligence?
*Examples of negligence are: running through a stop sign while
driving, leaving your gate open and your dog escaping and biting
someone, or not repairing a step in the stairs in your home and a
visitor falling down your stairs as a result of the broken step.
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• Yes, I think this standard should be applied to people with mental
illnesses
(please
explain
why):
________________________________________________
• No, I do not think this standard should be applied to people with
mental
illnesses
(please
explain
why):
________________________________________________
• Maybe/I
don’t
know
(please
explain
why):
________________________________________________
Q10 Please select which types of mental illnesses (if any) that you
think should be considered when deciding whether a defendant is
guilty of a tort. Each individual case, of course, would depend on the
particular facts of each defendant’s situation (the type of mental
illness itself would not be the sole basis for a finding of
innocence/guilt).
You can choose multiple answers. If you would like to add any
information or explanation to your answers, you can write in the text
boxes
next
to
each
answer
option.
*The types of mental illnesses listed are based on the chapter titles of
the DSM-5.
• NO mental illnesses
________________________________________________
• ALL of the below mental illnesses
________________________________________________
• Neurodevelopmental Disorders
________________________________________________
• Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders
________________________________________________
• Bipolar and Related Disorders
________________________________________________
• Depressive Disorders
________________________________________________
• Anxiety Disorders
________________________________________________
• Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders
________________________________________________
• Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders
________________________________________________
• Dissociative Disorders
________________________________________________
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• Somatic Symptom Disorders
________________________________________________
• Feeding and Eating Disorders
________________________________________________
• Elimination Disorders
________________________________________________
• Sleep-Wake Disorders
________________________________________________
• Sexual Dysfunctions
________________________________________________
• Gender Dysphoria
________________________________________________
• Disruptive, Impulse Control and Conduct Disorders
________________________________________________
• Substance Use and Addictive Disorders
________________________________________________
• Neurocognitive Disorders
________________________________________________
• Personality Disorders
________________________________________________
• Paraphilic Disorders
________________________________________________
• Other Disorders (please explain)
________________________________________________
Q11
Washington state currently allows “sudden mental incapacitation” as
a defense to negligence torts, but ONLY in the context of a defendant
negligently operating a motor vehicle.
The “sudden mental incapacitation” defense requires a defendant to
establish: (1) that they had no prior notice or forewarning of their
potential for becoming [mentally] “disabled,” and (2) that the
“disability” renders them incapable of conforming to the standards
of ordinary care.
Do you think that Washington should expand this “sudden mental
incapacitation” defense for all negligence torts rather than just motor
vehicle accidents?
• Yes, I think it should be an available defense (please explain why):
________________________________________________
• No, I do not think it should be an available defense (please explain
why): ________________________________________________
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• Maybe/I
don’t
know
(please
explain
________________________________________________

why):

Q12 Thank you very much for completing this survey! If there is
anything else you would like us to know, please fill out the text box
below.
Otherwise, if you have questions for the Primary Investigator please
feel free to email Gabrielle Lindquist at lindqg@uw.edu. Thank you
very much for taking the time to fill out this survey, your
participation is much appreciated.
________________________________________________________
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Appendix B
Civil Attorney Survey — Tort defendants with Mental Illnesses
Question 1.
Welcome to the research survey!
We are interested in the possibility of mental illness as a defense that
either decreases or exculpates a defendant’s liability in Washington state
tort suits. Prior to answering any survey questions, you will be presented
with information about mental health and tort law. You will then be asked
your professional opinion about defendants with mental illnesses who are
being sued in civil court for committing a tort in Washington state.
By completing this survey, you are consenting to participate in this study
and consenting to the potential use of your survey responses in the
researcher’s Washington Law Review article. However, your responses
will be kept anonymous, confidential, and in no way connected to your
name, email address, or other directly-identifying information.
The study should take you around 10-20 minutes to complete. Your
participation in this research is voluntary. You have the right to stop the
survey at any point, for any reason, and without any prejudice. If you
would like to contact the Principal Investigator in the study to discuss this
research, please e-mail Gabrielle Lindquist at lindqg@uw.edu.
By clicking the button below, you acknowledge that your participation in
the study is voluntary, that you are at least 18 years of age, and that you
are aware that you may choose to terminate your participation in the
survey at any time and for any reason (just exit the survey on your
computer).
Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop
computer. Some features may be less compatible for use on a mobile
device.
• I consent, begin the survey.
• I do not consent, I do not wish to participate.
Question 2.
Please select the professional title that applies to you:
• Civil Defense Attorney
 Civil Plaintiff’s Attorney
• Other (please explain): ______________________________
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Question 3.
Are you licensed by the Washington State Bar Association to practice
law in Washington state?
• Yes
• No
Question 4.
I have been practicing civil law in Washington state for:
•
•
•
•

Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
5 to 10 years
more than 10 years

Question 5.
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
CAREFULLY, as it will be necessary to answer all further survey
questions:
Intentional torts - mental illness not currently available as an
affirmative defense:
As you may know, Washington state allows insanity as an affirmative
defense for criminal prosecutions, but not for civil intentional torts suits.
That is, a person could be charged for assault in both criminal and civil
court separately, then be found not guilty by reason of insanity for the
criminal charges, but found guilty in civil court.
Negligence torts - mental illness not currently available as a
subjective standard:
As you may also know, Washington state tort law has an exception
(subjective standard) for children and people with physical disabilities,
but not for people with mental illnesses. Children and people with
physical disabilities are evaluated based on “a reasonable child” standard
and a “reasonable person with the defendant’s same physical disability”
standard. People with mental illnesses (even severe illnesses such as
Schizophrenia or Downs Syndrome) are not evaluated on a subjective
standard. That is, individuals with mental illnesses are held to the standard
of a reasonable person without a mental illness, even if their mental illness
may have been what caused, or contributed, to the negligence for which
they are being sued.
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Would an affirmative defense and/or subjective standard for
mental illness be “workable?”
If an affirmative mental illness defense to intentional torts were to be
implemented, the specific language would need to be “workable.” By
“workable” we mean that the actual text describing the defense would
need to be something that a jury or judge could use, in conjunction with
the expert testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist, to decide whether
the defendant’s mental illness is exculpatory or diminishes the
defendant’s liability. A subjective, “reasonable person with the
defendant’s mental illness” standard would need to be workable in this
way as well.
We want your opinion:
The next few pages of this survey will ask your opinion about the
potential use of mental illness as an affirmative defense to intentional
torts, as well as your opinion about the use of a subjective, “reasonable
person with the defendant’s mental illness” standard for negligence.
*You can scroll back up to this information at any time while you are
answering the remaining questions on this page of the survey.
Please indicate below if you have read the above information:
• Yes, I have read it.
• No, I have not read it.
Question 6.
In your opinion, should the following affirmative defense language
below be an option for defendants with mental illnesses who commit
intentional torts?
This affirmative defense language is modeled on the current “Diminished
Capacity” affirmative defense that Washington state currently allows in
criminal prosecutions:
Diminished Capacity Jury Instructions: ”Diminished Capacity may be
raised as a defense when either specific intent or knowledge is an element
of the tort. If specific intent or knowledge is an element, evidence of
diminished capacity can then be considered in determining whether the
defendant had the capacity to form the requisite mental state.”
*These Diminished Capacity instructions would be submitted to the jury
only if the defendant satisfies the following three requirements: (1) the
tort must include a particular mental state as an element; (2) the defendant
must present evidence of a mental disorder; and (3) expert testimony must
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logically and reasonably connect the defendant’s alleged mental condition
with the asserted inability to form the mental state required for the tort.
• Yes, I think this defense should be available (please explain why
below):
• No, I do not think this defense should be available (please explain
why below):
 Maybe/I don’t know (please explain why below):
• *Please
explain
why
you
chose
your
answer:
__________________________________________________________
Question 7.
Would the Diminished Capacity defense to intentional torts (language
above) be workable in a court of law?
By “workable” we mean, do you think a judge or juror would be able to
use the Diminished Capacity language to assess whether a defendant
qualifies for that affirmative defense based on expert testimony from a
psychologist or psychiatrist?
• Yes, it would be workable (please explain why below):
• No, it would not be workable (please explain why below):
 Maybe/I don’t know (please explain why below):
• *Please
explain
why
you
chose
your
answer:
__________________________________________________________
Question 8.
In your opinion, should the following affirmative defense language
below be an option for defendants with mental illnesses who commit
intentional torts?
This affirmative defense language is modeled on the Insanity
Defense jury instructions that Washington state currently allows in
criminal prosecutions:
Insanity Defense Jury Instructions: “For a defendant to be found not
guilty by reason of insanity you must find that, as a result of mental
disease or defect, the defendant’s mind was affected to such an extent that
the defendant was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the acts
with which the defendant is charged or was unable to tell right from wrong
with reference to the particular acts with which the defendant is charged.”
• Yes, I think this defense should be available (please explain why
below):
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• No, I do not think this defense should be available (please explain
why below):
 Maybe/I don’t know (please explain why below):
• *Please
explain
why
you
chose
your
answer:
__________________________________________________________
Question 9.
Would the Insanity Defense to intentional torts (language above) be
workable in a court of law?
*By “workable” we mean, do you think a judge or juror would be able to
use the Insanity Defense language to assess whether a defendant qualifies
for that affirmative defense based on expert testimony from a
psychologist/psychiatrist?
• Yes, it would be workable (please explain why below):
• No, it would not be workable (please explain why below):
 Maybe/I don’t know (please explain why below):
• *Please
explain
why
you
chose
your
answer:
__________________________________________________________
Question 10.
In your opinion, should the below “reasonable person with the
defendant’s mental illness” standard be an option for defendants with
mental illnesses being sued for civil negligence?
As explained earlier, a subjective, “reasonable person with the
defendant’s mental illness” standard for negligence tort defendants with
mental illnesses could either decrease or preclude a defendant’s
liability. The defendant’s negligent behavior would be evaluated based on
how a “reasonable person with the defendant’s mental illness” would have
behaved in a particular situation.
• Yes, I think this standard should be applied to people with mental
illnesses (please explain why below):
• No, I do not think this standard should be applied to people with
mental illnesses (please explain why below):
 Maybe/I don’t know (please explain why below):
• *Please
explain
why
you
chose
your
answer:
__________________________________________________________
Question 11.
Would the “reasonable person with the defendant’s mental illness”
subjective standard be a workable standard for defendants sued for
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negligence?
By “workable” we mean, would a judge or jury be able to decide whether
the defendant was acting “reasonably” given their mental illness under the
circumstances with the aid of testimony from a professional psychologist
or psychiatrist?
• Yes, it would be workable (please explain why below):
• No, it would not be workable (please explain why below):
 Maybe/I don’t know (please explain why below):
• *Please
explain
why
you
chose
your
answer:
__________________________________________________________
Question 12.
Washington state currently allows “sudden mental incapacitation” as
a defense to negligence torts, but ONLY in the context of a defendant
negligently operating a motor vehicle.
The “sudden mental incapacitation” defense requires a defendant to
establish: (1) that they had no prior notice or forewarning of their potential
for becoming [mentally] “disabled,” and (2) that the “disability” renders
them incapable of conforming to the standards of ordinary care.
Do you think that Washington should expand this “sudden mental
incapacitation” defense for all negligence torts rather than just car
accidents?
• Yes, I think it should be an available defense for all negligence torts
(please explain why below):
• No, I do not think it should be an available defense for all negligence
torts (please explain why below):
 Maybe/I don’t know (please explain why below):
•
*Please
explain
why
you
chose
your
answer:
__________________________________________________________
Question 13.
In your time as a practicing attorney, have you encountered (either
represented or opposed) any tort defendants who you believe would have
qualified for an affirmative defense of mental illness? If so, approximately
how many defendants? We understand this is a rough estimate.
*There is a text box provided at the end of the answer options if you would
like to elaborate on your answer.
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• None
• Yes, 1 to 10
• Yes, 10 to 20
• Yes, 20 to 30
• Yes, 30 to 40
• Yes, 40 to 50
• Yes, 50 or more
• If you would like to elaborate on your answer, please do so here:
__________________________________________________________
Question 14.
In your time as a practicing attorney, have you encountered (either
represented or opposed) any civil defendants who you believe should have
been evaluated for their negligence based on a “reasonable person with
the defendant’s mental illness” standard? If so, approximately how many
defendants? We understand this is a rough estimate.
*There is a text box provided at the end of the answer options if you would
like to elaborate on your answer.
• None
• Yes, 1 to 10
• Yes, 10 to 20
• Yes, 20 to 30
• Yes, 30 to 40
• Yes, 40 to 50
• Yes, 50 or more
• If you would like to elaborate on your answer, please do so here:
__________________________________________________________
Question 15.
Thank you very much for completing this survey! If there is
anything else you would like us to know, please fill out the text box
below.
Otherwise, if you have questions for the Primary Investigator please feel
free to email Gabrielle Lindquist at lindqg@uw.edu. Thanks again for
taking the time to fill out this survey, your participation is much
appreciated.
________________________________________________________

